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I.  INTRODUCTION
Online problems  are popularly  understood  to  be  easily  susceptible  to
offline  legal  categorizations  and,  thus,  solutions.1  "There  is  nothing  new
under the  sun," we say to one another over and over again in the cyberlaw
©  2005 Susan P. Crawford
t  Assistant  Professor,  Cardozo  School of Law.  Thanks  to  Lorrie  Cranor, David
Johnson, David Post, Michael  Steffen, Stewart Sterk, and participants  in the University  of
Pittsburgh School  of Law's "Where  IP Meets  IP:  Technology  and the Law" symposium
convened by Michael Madison.
1.  Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,  65  U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998)  (stating
that no  special  problems  are  created  by  the  Internet  that  have  not been  addressed  by
existing  conflict  of laws  and jurisdiction  concepts);  Jack  Goldsmith,  Regulation of the
Internet: Three Persistent  Fallacies,  73  CHI.-KENT  L.  REV.  1119,  1121  (1998)  (stating
that the "Net is not a separate place, and Net users are not removed from our world").1434
arena.  But  spyware2  appears  to  be  an  exception  to  this  received  world
view.  There  is nothing  quite like  spyware  in  the  "real"  world.  Unlike  an
infectious disease, some varieties of spyware can "phone home"  enormous
amounts  of personal data. Unlike  a  fixed surveillance  camera,  some  spy-
ware  can travel  with you wherever  you "go"  online.  And unlike  a black-
mail  note, which  is unambiguously  bad,  spyware  is very  difficult to  de-
fine-there  can  be  "good"  and "bad"  spyware  applications  that have  the
same  essential characteristics.  Spyware combines attributes of all three  of
these things.  Like  an  infectious  disease,  it  can  be  contracted without  the
user's knowledge and can have harmful,  amplified effects  inside the body
of the  user's  computer.  Like  a  surveillance  camera,  it  can watch  users
across  time  without  their  knowledge.  And  like  a  blackmail  note,  some
spyware  installations  may  force  users  into involuntary  relationships  that
feel oppressive.
Just as there is nothing quite like spyware  in the "real" world, no exist-
ing  offline  legal  or  regulatory  techniques  are  adequate  to  address  this
problem.  We  could  legislatively  require  that  users  consent  to particular
installations  of software  that may  watch  (and report  on)  their  activities;
sue  software  providers  under  existing  unfair  trade  practices  or  trespass
laws;3  or  let  the  marketplace  provide  software  applications  that  make  it
possible for users to protect  themselves. This Article  argues that only the
last of these three sets of actions will have any real effect on spyware,  and
that  software  developers  and  major  online  companies  have  already  re-
sponded  to  market  demands  for  help  by  releasing  useful  spyware-
combating products and services.
2.  This  Article  focuses  on  the  difficulty  of  defining  "spyware."  Spyware  is
generally understood  as software that is installed on a user's computer (often without the
user's  knowledge)  and  monitors  the  activities  of  that  computer,  "phoning  home"
information about the user or the computer's activities, changing the user's web browsing
settings  (homepage,  Internet  connection  settings),  or prompting  pop-up  advertisements.
Subsets of "spyware"  include "adware"  (software designed to generate advertising  based
on  web  use)  and "malware"  (software  designed  to  do  harm  to  a  computer).  State  and
federal  legislators have  defined "spyware"  in various ways.  For purposes of this Article,
the  term  "spyware"  is  used  to  mean  all  of these  things,  except  where  otherwise
specifically  indicated.  For  a  useful primer  on  the  various  meanings  of "spyware,"  see
CENTER  FOR  DEMOCRACY  AND  TECHNOLOGY  (CDT),  GHOSTS IN  OUR  MACHINES:
BACKGROUND  AND  POLICY  PROPOSALS  ON  THE  "SPYWARE"  PROBLEM  (Nov.  2003),
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/031100spyware.pdf.
3.  The Federal Trade  Commission has taken this route successfully.  See infra Part
II.E.3.a. This Article  is focused on the first and third of the three  options that  I describe,
and  it does  not  explore  the  various  litigation  routes  that  might  be  available  to  private
litigants.
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Proposed  legislative  cures  now  under  discussion  may  be  worse  than
the  diseases  they are  designed to  counteract.  Several  pending  or enacted
bills  (1) assume  that legislative  design of software  is appropriate  and  (2)
embrace  the  notion  that  "notice"  is an  effective  concept  in  the  spyware
context-two  legislative  directions  that this Article  explains are  bound to
have negative effects on lawful innovation.
I am  not claiming  that  legislation  in  this  area  signals  the  end  of the
civilized world or will bring  a halt to the progress of science. To the extent
that draft bills focus  on bad behaviors rather than software design and no-
tice,  their enactment will have little  effect on innovation and  may  in fact
be  helpful. I  am concerned,  however,  that the  software  design and notice
elements of pending  spyware legislation may be  exploited in the  future as
part  of the larger  power  struggle between  people  who  want to  constrain
what software can do and people who want to write code.
Three great industries want to constrain the writing of software and the
functioning  of the  Internet:  law  enforcement,  the  content  industry,  and
telecommunications  companies.  Having early legislative  design  mandates
for  software  focused  on  "spyware"-something  most  people  agree  is
"bad,"  even if they  cannot precisely  define it-is useful  for these  indus-
tries.4  Later design  mandates  aimed  at making  tappability  easier for  law
enforcement  or copyright policing easier  for the content industry or taxa-
tion easier  for telecom  agencies will be able to take advantage of the spy-
4.  For example,  the  content  community draws  specific  links between peer-to-peer
("p2p")  applications  used  to facilitate  filesharing  and  spyware.  See The Dark Side of a
Bright Idea: Could Personal  and National Security Risks Compromise the Potential of
Peer to Peer File Sharing Networks?: Hearing  Before the S. Comm.  on the Judiciary,
108th  Cong.  (2003)  (statement  of Sen. Orrin  Hatch).  Senator Hatch's  comments  at  the
conclusion of the hearing have been summarized as follows:
Sen. Orrin  Hatch (R-UT),  the Chairman of the Committee, also focused
on  copyright  infringement  on  P2P  networks,  and suggested  that  if no
other  way  can  be  found  to  protect  copyrighted  works  from  piracy,
'destroying  computers'  should be permitted  ....  [Sen. Hatch  said that
he  was]  also  troubled  that many  P2P networks  require  their users  to
install so-called  'spyware'  or 'adware'-programs  that monitor, collect,
and  report  information  about  the  Internet  'browsing'  habits  of  a
particular user.
Senate Committee Holds Hearing  on P2P  Networks, TECH LAW JOURNAL,  June  18,  2003,
http://www.techlawjoumal.com/home/newsbriefs/2003/06d.asp.  Some  very  popular  p2p
applications,  such  as  eDonkey,  iMesh,  Kazaa,  and  Morpheus,  bundle  optional
installations or installations disclosed only in lengthy license agreements that are difficult
to  read.  Benjamin  Edelman,  Comparison of  Unwanted  Software  Installed by  P2P
Programs, Mar.  7,  2005,  http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/p2p.  It  would  be  very
helpful  to  the  content  community  to  be  able  to  outlaw  p2p  networks  by  using  laws
facially addressed to spyware.
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ware legislative  example.  We  need  to decide  what threshold of pain  suf-
fered by code writers  makes  us jump up and down  and  say "don't legis-
late."  This Article  is designed to encourage  legislators  to  pause  and con-
sider  the  larger  power  relationships  implicated  by  these  bills  before
launching into further fruitless legislative efforts to end "spyware."
Part II of this Article surveys the legislative  landscape  as of mid-2005.
Prompted by concerns over pop-up ads that were launched by third parties
when users visited particular  sites,  the Utah  legislature passed  a  spyware
bill in 2003 that has been widely imitated in other states. Although the ini-
tial  Utah  bill  was  successfully  challenged  as  violative  of the  dormant
Commerce  Clause,  as of May  8, 2005  at  least  twenty-seven  states  were
considering  or had passed spyware legislation-including Utah, which had
taken  another  stab  at  a  bill  barring  unauthorized  pop-up  advertising.
Meanwhile,  there  has been  a great  deal of spyware-related  legislative  en-
ergy  expended  at  the  federal  level.  Two  spyware  bills  overwhelmingly
passed  in  the  House  in  2004,  and  combined  versions  of those  bills  are
likely to be supported by both houses of Congress in 2005.
All of the  state bills trigger  substantial dormant  Commerce  Clause  is-
sues and are unlikely to be  found to be  constitutional.5  More importantly,
however, the legislative  approaches taken at both the state and federal  lev-
els have three major problems. First, many of these bills are overly regula-
tory, setting forth  detailed design mandates  and notice requirements.  Sec-
ond,  these  legislative  efforts  are  doomed  to be  unsuccessful  in  terms  of
producing  a reduction  in spyware-just  as  the  CAN-SPAM  Act of 2003
was unsuccessful  in reducing the volume of spam.6 Third, many legislators
appear to view spyware as an assault on privacy interests,  a view that does
not illuminate  the problem of spyware. In  fact, people  are upset  by some
forms  of spyware because  they create  oppressive,  unwanted relationships,
not because they violate some preexisting idealized privacy interest. Exist-
ing  law  directed  toward  remediating  oppressive  relationships,  including
both prima facie tort claims and federal statutory schemes, may adequately
address spyware.
5.  Given  the  state  laws'  focus  on  software  content,  these  laws  may  be
unconstitutional  under the  First Amendment  as well. See ACLU v. Miller, 977  F. Supp.
1228  (N.D.  Ga.  1997)  (invalidating a  state law  criminalizing  Internet  transmissions  that
falsely identify  the sender and holding that a state  may impose  content-based restrictions
only to promote a "compelling  state interest" and only through use of "the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest"). These statutes may not be sufficiently narrowly
tailored, may sweep protected  speech within their scope, and are often vague in their use
of terms. See infra Part II.D. 1.
6.  See infra Part II.D.2.
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Part III provides concrete  suggestions for addressing spyware. There is
no one  organization with sufficient knowledge to recognize  and deal with
"bad"  spyware.  Only  a technical  approach-and  only  a particular kind  of
technical  approach  at that-will  work.  Technical  actors  need  to  take  an
"immune  system"  approach  to spyware,  dividing their efforts  and experi-
menting  in the  field the  same way  immunity networks  do.  If we think of
the legal system as a medical expert operating on this difficult disease, our
first  priority  must be  to  wait  to  allow  these  already-emerging  immunity
networks to take effect, and to "do  no harm"  in the interim. This is a time
for patience, not for the knife.
Part IV asks: what is the legal role of these immunity networks? It may
be time to recognize that individuals, and their unhappy relationships  with
spyware,  will not always be  the most important  actors  on the legal stage.
We are part of a collective technical environment that has become too dif-
ficult for us to understand or deal with as people, and too difficult for any
existing  legal  institutions  to  take  on  effectively.  As a result,  individuals
may need to choose to cede some control over their machines to technical
networks that will help in the constant fight against oppressive adware and
malware.  This  is not  a move  towards  enforced  similarity,  as  in  commu-
nism. Nor  is this  a move towards  a  voting,  democratic  approach  to  soft-
ware,  where  software  that  is  voted  "bad"  becomes  illegal.  Instead,  we
should recognize that there is already  in the world  a third way of govern-
ing  that we need to  embrace  as we  face difficult  technical  warfare:  com-
peting networks.  Only by allowing these networks  to "represent"  and pro-
tect us will we survive the coming difficulties. Such networks will provide
the benefits of connection as well as the technical protections on which the
spyware debate focuses.
II.  THE LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE
Because  there is  so much legislative activity on the spyware  front, the
most useful  way to  discuss U.S.  spyware  legislation  is to tell the  story  of
the initial Utah state  statute and its constitutional problems, clump the rest
of the pending (or enacted) state bills into three groups (bad acts bills, no-
tice bills, and trademark bills), and spend some time on the implications of
the  federal  bills  that  will  likely  pass  before  this  Article  is published.  If
nothing  else,  this discussion  should  signal that we  have  not settled  on  a
central legislative metaphor for dealing with spyware. Is spyware a type of
software that does things that would surprise a user (if the user knew what
was  happening)?  Is  spyware  a  type  of software  that is  automatically  in-
stalled on a  "protected computer" without  the user being given  an oppor-
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tunity to  refuse?  Is  spyware  a type  of software  that  allows the  unauthor-
ized use of trademarks  in search  terms (or visits to particular  websites)  to
prompt the display  of unauthorized  advertisements?  Is  spyware  anything
that tracks what a user does online, whether or not the technology  collects
personally  identifiable  information?  Apparently  it depends which  legisla-
tor is talking.
A.  The Initial Utah State Statute: The Spyware Control Act
Utah's  2004  Spyware  Control  Act 7  was  a  reaction  to  the  success  of
WhenU's  SaveNow  program  in  presenting  pop-up  ads  to  computers
browsing  the web. The  SaveNow  program  is downloaded  by users  in re-
turn for obtaining a piece of freeware-a  popular, free piece of software. 8
The consumer  is presented with a license agreement  stating that SaveNow
will generate  "contextual"  pop-up ads. After the user  clicks "I  agree,"  the
SaveNow program is installed on the user's computer  and causes  a direc-
tory of search terms and URLs  to be saved  on the user's desktop. As  the
user browses,  his/her  use  of search  terms  and web  addresses  causes  the
presentation  of pop-up  ads  and coupons.  Although  ad  impressions  trig-
gered  by  the  software  are  reported  back  to  central  SaveNow  servers,
search terms and websites visited by the particular computer are not.
1-800  Contacts,  a Utah  company that was  unhappy that  competitors'
ads  were  triggered  by the  SaveNow  software  to  appear  in windows  over
1-800 Contacts'  site,  sued WhenU,  the  company behind SaveNow.9 After
1-800  Contacts  gained  an early  victory against  WhenU  in that  lawsuit,10
7.  H.B. 323, 2004 Gen. Sess. (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-39-101  et seq.).
8.  Examples  include  MP3  players,  screensavers,  file  sharing  applications,  online
games, and shopping  tools.
9.  1-800  Contacts  sued WhenU  in  federal  court  in New  York on  the theory  that
WhenU's  advertisements infringe  1-800 Contacts'  trademark and copyrights and initially
prevailed.  1-800  Contacts, Inc. v.  WhenU.com, Inc.,  309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 472 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)  (granting preliminary  injunction on trademark challenge but denying the  copyright
challenge).  The  Second  Circuit reversed  this decision  in June  2005,  ruling that  WhenU
does not "use"  1-800  Contact's  trademarks within the meaning  of the Lanham Act,  153
U.S.C.  § 1127  (2000),  when  it  (1)  includes  1-800  Contact's  website  address  in  an
unpublished  directory  of terms  that trigger delivery of advertising  or (2) causes  branded
pop-up  ads to appear on  a computer screen next to the  1-800 Contact's website window.
1-800  Contacts,  Inc.  v.  WhenU.com,  Inc.,  No.  04-0026(L),  2005  U.S.  App.  LEXIS
12711,  at *5 (2d Cir. June 27, 2005).
10.  1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. at 467. The New York district court decision  (now
reversed) conflicted  with  two earlier  decisions by  federal  district courts  in Virginia  and
Michigan.  See U-Haul  Int'l, Inc.  v. WhenU.com,  Inc.,  279  F.  Supp.  2d  723  (E.D.  Va.
2003)  (holding  that  WhenU  pop-up  advertisements  do  not  represent  trademark
infringement,  unfair  competition,  trademark  dilution,  or  copyright  infringement);  Wells
Fargo  & Co.  v. WhenU.com,  Inc.,  293  F.  Supp.  2d 734  (E.D. Mich.  2003)  (same).  The
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1-800-Contacts  went the  legislative route and urged the Utah legislature to
pass  a bill  addressing  SaveNow's  tactics."  Although  a large  coalition  of
substantial  online companies  lobbied against the bill,12 it was enacted  into
law  in  March  2004.13 This  Act barred  any  person  from  installing  "spy-
ware"  on another person's computer or causing such installation. 14 Part  of
the bill  appeared  to  be  aimed directly  at WhenU's  business.  The bill  de-
fined "Context  Based  Triggering Mechanisms"  as "a  software based  trig-
ger or program residing on a consumer's computer that displays an adver-
tisement according  to:  (a) the current  Internet website accessed by a user;
or  (b)  the  contents  or  characteristics  of the  current  Internet  website  ac-
cessed by a user." 15 According to the bill, use of a Context Based Trigger-
ing  Mechanism to display  an advertisement "that partially or wholly cov-
ers or obscures paid advertising or other content on an Internet  website in
a way that interferes  with a user's ability to view the Internet website"  was
Gator  Corporation,  now owned  by  Claria  Corp.,  has  also  been  sued  several  times  for
similar actions.  See, e.g.,  In re Gator  Corp.,  259  F.  Supp.  2d  1378,  1380-81  (J.P.M.L.
2003)  (providing  docket  information  for  consolidated  actions).  Washingtonpost.
Newsweek Interactive Co.,  LLC. v. Gator Corp. resulted  in an injunction in favor of the
website  operators and eventually  settled  in 2003.  No. 02-909-A,  2002 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS
20879  (E.D. Va. July  16,  2002). The terms of the settlement have not been made  public.
Todd Weiss, Online newspapers settle lawsuit with Gator  Ad service, COMPUTERWORLD,
Nov. 2, 2003, http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;  1502815315;relcomp; 1.
11.  See Burns, Wyden  Told to Focus Anti-Spyware Bill on Action, Not Technology,
5  WASHINGTON  INTERNET  DAILY  57,  Mar.  24,  2004  ("The  Utah  Bill  resulted  from
WhenU  triumphing  in  court  over  1-800-Contacts,  a  Utah  company  that  sued  to  stop
WhenU ads from popping up over its web site.").
12.  The  Information  Technology  Association  of America (ITAA),  Google, Yahoo!
Inc., Microsoft Corp., America Online, the Software & Information Industry Association,
Oracle Corp.,  eBay, and Amazon.com  formed an ad hoc coalition opposing the bill. Utah
Governor  Mulls  Spyware  Bill,  Industry  opposes:  Constitutional  Issues  Raised,
ECOMMERCE  LAW  DAILY,  Mar.  12,  2004,  http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/ecd.
nsf/0/4574a5cb36c6555985256e5500022a0b?OpenDocument.
13.  The Spyware  Control Act was passed by the Utah Legislature on March 3,  2004
after  a  twenty-six  to  zero  vote  in  its  favor.  Utah  State  Legislature,  H.B.  323  Fourth
Substitute,  http://www.le.state.ut.us/%7E2004/htmdoc/hbillhtm/HBO323S04.htm  (last
visited  Aug.  19, 2005).  The bill was  signed  into law by  Governor  Olene  S. Walker  on
March 23,  2004. Id.
14.  "Spyware"  was  defined as "software  residing  on a  computer that monitors the
computer's usage, sends  information about the computer's  usage to a remote computer or
server,  or  displays  or  causes  to  be  displayed  an  advertisement  in  response  to  the
computer's  usage."  UTAH  CODE  ANN. § 13-40-102(4)(2),  (b)  (2004)  (subsection
indicators omitted).
15.  Id. §  13-40-102(1).
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illegal.1 6 The bill provided for a private  cause of action and set damages at
$10,000  for each separate violation. 17
Following a challenge by WhenU,  a Utah state court on June 22,  2004
enjoined  this Act  from  coming  into  force  on  dormant  Commerce  Clause
grounds.' 8 The court found that plaintiff had shown that compliance  with
the  statute  would be  difficult  and  expensive,  that the  statute  was vague,
and that it created  a risk of different penalties and mandates being applied
to online companies from state to state.' 9
In early 2005,  Utah introduced revisions to this Act that are driven by
pop-up  ad generation  concerns.20  The revised  Act  defines  "spyware"  as
"software  on  the  computer  of a  [Utah]  user"  that  "collects  information
about  an Internet website  at the time the Internet website is being viewed
in this  state"  and uses that information contemporaneously to display pop-
up ads.2'  The key violation under the  new  Act is to  display an  ad  in re-
sponse to  a  particular  trademark  when  that advertisement  has  been pur-
chased  by someone  other than the mark owner.22  Damages under the Act
have  been reduced  from  $10,000  per violation to  $500 per each separate
occurrence  resulting  in display  of an unauthorized  advertisement,  plus  a
possibility of treble damages and attorneys'  fees and costs.23
The  revised  Utah  bill  attempts  to  deal  with  the  dormant  Commerce
Clause problem by applying  its penalties  only to spyware-that  is installed
on the  computer of a Utah resident  that collects  information  "at  the time
[an]  Internet  website  is  being  viewed  in  this  state. 24  It provides  a  safe
harbor  for advertisers  who  "request[]  information about the user's state of
residence  before  sending  the  spyware  or  displaying  a  pop-up  advertise-
ment to the user" when the user says he/she does not live in Utah. 25
16.  Id. § 13-40-201.
17.  Id. § 13-40-301(1),  (2).
18.  WhenU.com,  Inc.  v.  State,  No.  040907578  (3d  Dist.  Utah  June  22,  2004),
available at http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-utah/pi-ruling-transcript.
19.  Id.
20.  Spyware Control Act Revisions, H.B.  104, 2005 Leg.,  56th Sess. (Utah 2005).
21.  UTAH CODE ANN.  §  13-40-102(8)  (2005).
22.  Id.  § 13-40-201.
23.  Id. §§  13-40-301,  302.
24.  It is not  clear that  this will be enough  to solve  the  dormant Commerce  Clause
problem; after all,  there is no requirement  that the communication that is unlawful-here,
the transmission  of the software  to Utah residents-take place  entirely within Utah. See
Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.  Supp. 160,  169-170 (S.D.N.Y.  1997).
25.  UTAH CODE ANN.  §§  13-40-201,  202 (2005).
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B.  Other State Bills
1.  BadActs
Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan,
Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Virginia,  and Washington  are consid-
ering or have enacted  "bad acts laundry list" bills.26 The bills outlaw soft-
ware that  deceptively  "takes  control"  of a  computer  by modifying  home
pages, changing bookmarks,  changing modem or other Internet access set-
tings,  transmitting  or  relaying  unauthorized  e-mail  messages,  using  the
computer as part of a distributed denial of service attack, or "opening mul-
tiple,  sequential,  stand  alone advertisements"  in a browser that  cannot be
closed without turning  off the computer or  closing the  browser.  The  col-
lection of personally  identifiable  information  through  deceptive  means  is
also illegal under  these bills, which  focus on the use of keystroke  loggers
as well as software that gathers  information about the websites visited by a
user. The bills make illegal  the deceptive prevention of a user's  efforts to
block software  installations, misrepresentations  that software will be unin-
stalled  or  disabled  by  what the  user  does next,  and  deceptive  actions  to
disable anti-spyware  software. These bills prohibit misrepresentations  that
software  is needed  for  security  or  privacy or  in  order  to  open,  view,  or
play  a  particular  type  of content.  And  the  state  legislatures  working  on
these "bad acts"  bills intend to  continue their work. For example,  the pre-
amble to the California act states bravely that "it  is the intent of the Legis-
lature to  revise  the  provisions  in  this  act as  needed  to  fully protect  con-
sumers  from  additional unfair  and  deceptive  practices  and  to  address  fu-
ture innovations in computer technology and practices.
27
2.  Trademark Concerns
Alaska, Indiana,  Massachusetts,  New Hampshire,  and Tennessee,  like
Utah, have  focused  on the use  of software  to trigger unauthorized  adver-
26.  S.B.  122, 2005 Leg.  (Ala. 2005);  S.B. 2904,  2005 Leg., Reg.  Sess. (Ark. 2005);
H.B.  2414,  47th  Leg.,  1st Reg.  Sess.  (Ariz.  2005);  CAL.  Bus.  & PROF.  CODE  § 22947
(Deering 2005)  (imposing  a $1000  penalty per violation);  H.B. 380,  94th Gen.  Ass. (Ill.
2005); H.B.  945,  2005  Leg.,  Reg. Sess.  (Md. 2005);  S.B.  151,  2005  Leg.  (Mich. 2005);
L.B. 316, 99th Leg.,  1st Sess. (Neb.  2005); A.B. 549, 2005-2006 Reg.  Sess. (N.Y. 2005);
H.  6211,  Gen. Ass.,  Jan. Sess. (R.I.  2005); H.B.  2215, 2005 Leg.,  Gen. Ass. (Va. 2005);
H.B.  1012,  59th Leg.,  2005 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005). For updated status of state spyware
bills,  see National  Conference  of State Legislatures,  2005  State Legislation  Relating  to
Internet  Spyware  or  Adware,  http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/spyware05.htm  (last
visited Aug.  19, 2005).
27.  CAL. Bus. & PROF.  CODE § 22947.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
tisements. 28 To  avoid  a  "spyware"  categorization  under these  bills,  soft-
ware  that triggers the display of ads must clearly  identify the name of the
entity  responsible  for delivering  the  advertisement  in the body  of the  ad
itself and the ad must not be  triggered by an unauthorized  trademark use.
"Spyware"  is defined to exclude "software  or data that reports to an Inter-
net web site only information previously stored by the Internet web site on
the user's computer."
29
These bills  also require  user consent  for "spyware"  to  be  installed  le-
gally.  Consent  will require  user  agreement  to  a  full,  detailed,  plain  lan-
guage license  agreement that,  among other things,  instructs the  user how
to distinguish  the "spyware"  advertisements  from  other  advertisements.
30
Trademark  owners  and  website  operators  have  a  private  right  of action
under these bills, and can seek damages of $10,000  for each violation plus
treble damages and attorneys fees.
31
3.  Notice Concerns
Michigan,  Pennsylvania,  Oregon,  Tennessee,  and Texas  have  enacted
or are  considering notice  bills, under which "spyware,"  broadly defined,32
28.  S.B.  140,  24th  Leg.  (Alaska  2005);  H.B.  1714,  2005  Reg.  Sess.  (Ind.  2005)
(section  2  provides  that  "'context  based  triggering  mechanism'  means  a  program  or
software  based  trigger that:  (1) resides  on  a consumer's  computer;  and  (2)  displays  an
advertisement  according to (A) the current Internet web site accessed by a user; or (B) the
contents  or characteristics of the current Internet web site accessed by a user"); S.B. 273,
184th  Gen.  Ct.  (Mass.  2005)  (defining  spyware  as  follows:  "software  residing  on  a
computer  that  monitors  the  computer's  usage  and  either  sends  information  about  the
computer's  usage  to  a  remote  computer  or  server  or  causes  to  be  displayed  an
advertisement  in response to the computer's usage,  or both"); H.B. 47 (N.H. 2005); H.B.
1742,  104th Gen. Ass. (Tenn. 2005).
29.  H.B.  1714, § 2.
30.  Id.
31.  Id.
32.  A draft Michigan  spyware bill  states:  "Spyware"  means  computer  instructions
or software  installed into a computer program,  computer,  computer system, or computer
network for any of the following purposes:
(a)  monitoring  the  use  of a  computer  program,  computer,  computer
system, or computer network.
(b)  sending  information  about  the  use  of  a  computer  program,
computer,  computer system, or computer network to a remote computer
or server or data collection site or point.
(c)  displaying  an  advertisement  or  causing  an  advertisement  to  be
displayed  in  response  to  the  use  of a  computer  program,  computer,
computer system, or computer network.
S.B.  1315  (Mich.  2004)  § 5a(5).  The  Pennsylvanian  counterpart  defines  spyware  as
follows:
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is illegal unless a consumer has a great deal of information supplied to him
or her about the software:  name and  contact information of the person in-
stalling  it (or on whose  behalf it is being  installed), notice of intent to in-
stall the  software  and a description of how  it  will affect  its target,  a full
license agreement, and a method for refusing the installation and avoiding
any further contact. Oregon provides that such notices "shall be in at least
10-point boldfaced type, in immediate proximity  to the space reserved  for
the owner to agree to the installation.
' " 33
C.  Overarching Commerce Clause Issues with Pending State Bills
All  of the state bills pose  substantial dormant Commerce  Clause prob-
lems. Even where the bills provide a state nexus (such  as, in the Utah bill,
the  scope  limitation  to  Utah  residents'  computers  and  operating  when
those residents  are in  fact in  Utah),  the  impact  of these  bills  will not be
limited to  conduct occurring  within the relevant  state.  "[P]urely  intrastate
communications  over  the  Internet"  do  not  exist.34  Although  these  state
bills and acts focus on spyware that has been installed on the computers of
users  inside  the  state,  that  installation  requires  a  transmission  that  will
An executable  computer  program  that  automatically  and  without the
control of a computer  user gathers and transmits to the provider  of the
program or to a third party either of the following types of information:
(1) Personal information or data of a user.
(2) Data regarding computer usage, including, but not limited to, which
Internet sites are, or have been, visited ....
H.B.  574  § 2  (Penn.  2005)  (introduced  Feb.  16,  2005);  see also H.B.  2302,  73rd  Leg.
Ass., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2005).  It is worth noting that much of the Pennsylvania bill is
taken up with rules about commercial  e-mail,  all of which should, presumably, have been
preempted  by  CAN-SPAM.  The  Tennessee  and  Texas  bills  contain  both "notice"  and
"trademark"  elements.  H.B.  1742,  104th  Gen.  Ass.  (Tenn.  2005);  S.B.  327,  79th  Leg.
(Tex. 2005).
33.  H.B. 2302,  73rd Leg. Ass., 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2005) § 2(3).
34.  See Am. Libraries  Ass 'n,  969 F. Supp.  at 171  (striking down a New York statute
that  prohibited  online  dissemination  of harnful materials  to  minors  because  it  did  not
require that the communication  take place  entirely within New  York state and there was
no way to limit the reach of the statute to New York); People v. Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d  248,
256  (N.Y.  App.  Div.  1999)  (holding  that  a  New  York  statute  criminalizing  the
dissemination  of indecent  material to minors through the Internet in order to lure minors
to engage in sexual activity passed dormant commerce  clause analysis); People v. Lipsitz,
663  N.Y.S.2d  468, 475  (N.Y. Sup.  Ct.  1997)  (holding that the  application of New York
consumer  protection  laws  to  New  York  business pursuant  to  Internet  solicitations  was
proper under the dormant Commerce  Clause). The Supreme Court has decided that state
regulatory schemes that permit in-state  wineries to ship alcohol to consumers but restrict
the  ability of out-of-state  wineries  to  do  the  same  are  unconstitutional  under  the  21st
Amendment  and  the  dormant  Commerce  Clause.  Granholm  v.  Heald,  125  S.  Ct.  1885
(2005).
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have  come-necessarily-from  out of state.  Thus,  because  these  statutes
may impose burdens on out-of-state  communications that are not necessar-
ily unlawful,  their constitutionality  is suspect.35 Web  publishers  and soft-
ware developers  cannot effectively prevent the flow of information to any
given state.36  State regulations  may burden  interstate  commerce  "when  a
statute... has the practical  effect of requiring out-of-state  commerce to be
conducted  at  the  regulating  state's  direction,''37 and  these  state  statutes
have  precisely  this effect.  Moreover,  and perhaps  more  importantly,  im-
posing state regulations in this area will subject the Internet to inconsistent
regulations, something that is likely to make a reviewing court uncomfort-
able.38
35.  See Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96,  104 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding a
state  statute  concerning  dissemination  of material  harmful  to  minors  unconstitutional
under  the  dormant  Commerce  Clause  and  First  Amendment);  ACLU  v.  Johnson,  194
F.3d  1149,  1160-63  (10th  Cir.  1999)  (same);  PSINet v. Chapman,  167 F.  Supp.  2d 878,
882,  891  (W.D. Va. 2001)  (same); Cyberspace  Commc'ns, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F.  Supp. 2d
737,  739-40,  751-52 (E.D. Mich.  1999)  (same),  aff'd, 238 F.3d 420  (6th  Cir. 2000);  cf
People  v.  Hsu,  99  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  184  (Cal.  Ct.  App.  2000)  (finding  a  state  statute
criminalizing  pedophile  activity constitutional because  it included an intent  requirement
and prohibiting transmission of harmful  material to seduce minors  would not burden any
legitimate commerce).
36.  It is  a  matter  of scholarly  dispute  whether  technology  now  exists  that  could
enable  websites  to  determine,  in  an  accurate  and  cost-effective  fashion,  where  their
visitors  are  coming  from.  Compare  Joel  Reidenberg,  Technology  and  Internet
Jurisdiction, 153  U. PA.  L.  REv.  (forthcoming  2005)  ("Commercial  pressures  and the
dynamic  nature  of  the  Internet  have  resulted  in  geolocation  and  the  re-creation  of
geographic  origin  and destination."),  and Michael  A.  Geist,  Is  There a  There  There?
Toward Greater Certainty  for Internet  Jurisdiction,  16 BERKELEY  TECH. L.J.  1345,  1401
(2001)  (pointing  to  the  efficacy  of  geolocation  technologies),  with  Andrea  M.
Matwyshyn,  Of Nodes  and Power Laws:  A  Network  Theory  Approach to  Internet
Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 Nw. U.  L. REV.  493,  520  (2004)  ("Geolocation
technologies,  while  demonstrating  relatively  high  levels  of  accuracy  for  marketing
purposes,  are  still  imperfect,  both  for  the  Internet  and  other  forms  of  Network
Communications;  they do not offer adequate  levels of certainty for jurisdiction  purposes
to be  mandated as the tool of choice  for jurisdictional determinations.  For example, the
European  Union  believes  that  geolocation  technologies  are  inadequate  tools  for  the
purpose of assessing value-added  tax on e-commerce."  (citations omitted)).  I consider the
best-regarded  free  geolocation  service,  NetGeo, out of date  and  increasingly  inaccurate,
while  the services that are  more accurate  (Akamai  Edgescape, Digital Envoy, and Quova
Geopoint) cater to large enterprises  and charge  steep monthly subscription fees.
37.  Brown & Williamson Tobacco  Corp. v.  Pataki,  320 F.3d 200,  208-09  (2d  Cir.
2003)  (citations omitted).
38.  See Am.  Booksellers Found., 342  F.3d  at  104  ("[A]t  the  same  time  that  the
internet's  geographic  reach  increases  Vermont's  interest  in  regulating  out-of-state
conduct, it makes  state regulation  impracticable.  We think it likely  that the internet will
soon  be  seen  as  falling  within  the  class  of  subjects  that  are  protected  from  State
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D.  Federal Bills
The 108th Congress was a time of great legislative activity  on the sub-
ject of spyware,  and the  109th  is proving  to be a similarly  active period.
Although no bills have passed  in either the  House  or the Senate  as of the
time of the preparation of this Article, it is very likely that spyware legisla-
tion will  pass later this year.  Bills on the  list, each of which  is discussed
below, include the SPY ACT, the I-SPY ACT, and the SPY-BLOCK Act.
1.  SPYACT
The House bill in the lead as of May 2005, H.R.29 (The Securely Pro-
tect  Yourself Against  Cyber  Trespass  Act (SPY  ACT)),  which  preempts
state legislation on these issues, is both a "laundry  list of bad acts" bill and
a  notice  bill.39  The  SPY  ACT,  which  passed  in  the  House  on  May  23,
2005,  contains a  list of "bad  acts"  that is very  similar to the lists set forth
in  the  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Arizona,  California,  Illinois,  Michigan,  Ne-
regulation  because  they  'imperatively  demand[  ]  a  single  uniform  rule."')  (quoting
Cooley  v. Bd. of Wardens,  53  U.S.  299,  319 (1851)).  On the  other hand, Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.,  requires  that "[w]here  the  statute regulates  even-handedly  to  effectuate  a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate  commerce are only incidental,
it will  be  upheld  unless  the burden  imposed  on  such  commerce  is  clearly excessive  in
relation to  the  putative  local benefits".  397 U.S.  137,  142  (1970).  Some  commentators
have argued that the Pataki approach to dormant Commerce  Clause issues is overreaching
and  insufficiently  nuanced.  See generally Jack  L.  Goldsmith  and  Alan  0.  Sykes,  The
Internet and the Dormant Commerce  Clause, 110  YALE  L.  J.  785,  787  (2001)  ("The
dormant Commerce Clause, properly understood, leaves states with much more flexibility
to regulate  Internet transactions than  is commonly thought.");  Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65  U.  CHI.  L.  REv.  1199,  1212  (1998)  (spillover  effects  of  local
regulations  are  "a  commonplace  consequence  of  the  unilateral  application  of  any
particular  law  to  transnational  activity  in  our  increasingly  interconnected  world");
Michael  W.  Loudenslager,  Allowing  Another  Policeman  on  the  Information
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism  on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17  BYU J.  PUB.  L.  191  (2003)  (stating  that deference  to  state police
powers requires  narrower reading of dormant Commerce  Clause).
39.  A 2004  version  of the The  SPY ACT passed  the House  in  October  2004 by a
vote  of 399-1.  Andrew  Noyes,  Spyware Bill OK'd by House Commerce Committee, 6
WASHINGTON  INTERNET  DAILY  47,  Mar.  10,  2005.  Its  sponsor,  Representative  Mary
Bono of California, reintroduced  the  SPY ACT  in January 2005.  The  Subcommittee  on
Commerce,  Trade,  and Consumer Protection  reported  out H.R. 29  on Feb.  16,  2005.  On
March  4,  2005,  an  amended  version  of  the  bill  was  proposed  by  the  Commerce
Committee,  and  on  May  23,  2005,  the  bill  passed  in  the  House.  GovTrack.us,  109th
Congress:  Securely  Protect  Yourself  Against  Cyber  Trespass  Act,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-29  (last  visited  Aug.  29,  2005).
Chairman Barton of Texas  has vowed to get H.R. 29 to the President's  desk during 2005.
See Michael  Grebb, Revised Spyware Bill Moves Ahead, WIRED NEWS,  Mar.  10,  2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,  1  283,66848,00.html.
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braska, New  York, Rhode  Island, Virginia, and  Washington proposed (or
passed)  bills:  unauthorized  "taking  control"  of the  computer,  modifying
settings  of the  computer  without  authorization,  modem  hijacking,  using
the computer  as part of a network of computers  to cause  damage, deliver-
ing uncloseable  advertisements,  collecting personally identifiable  informa-
tion by keystroke logging, phishing, and rendering security software  inop-
erable.40
The SPY ACT "notice" provisions  are far more complicated than those
found in most of the state level bills.41 The Act begins by creating the term
Information  Collection  Program  (ICP).  According  to  the  Act,  an  ICP  is
computer  software  that  collects  personally  identifiable  information  and
sends  it  on to anyone  else,  or uses it to  show  an  advertisement.  The bill
contains a list of specific information that is considered "personally identi-
fiable. 42 Next, the Act goes on to include in the definition of an ICP com-
puter  software  that  collects  information  about  webpages  accessed  by  a
computer43 (whether  or  not  personally  identifiable)  and  uses  it  to  show
advertisements.  This  is potentially a  very broad  category of code.  HTML
code,  Java  script, noncommercial  applications,  and very  localized  search
functions  that  show  ads  based  on  pages  visited  within  a  site  or  search
terms  employed  within  a  particular  application  might  all  fall  within  this
definition.
44
To this broad category of software,  the SPY ACT applies an opt-in no-
tice  and consent provision, making  it illegal to transmit  an ICP to or exe-
cute an ICP  on  a computer unless the ICP (1) provides  notice  (including
40.  See supra note 26.
41.  Florida  has  introduced  S.B.  2162,  2005  Leg.,  Reg.  Sess.  (Fla.  2005),  and
Georgia has introduced S.B.  127, 2004-05  Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005), both of which appear to
be very closely modeled on the SPY ACT.
42.  SPY  ACT § 10  (including  specific information,  like name,  physical address,  e-
mail  address,  phone  number,  SSN,  tax  ID  number,  passport  number,  driver's  license
number, credit card number, access code, password, and date of birth).
43.  The SPY ACT potentially covers all devices that compute  around the world. See
infra note 50.
44.  Section 3(b)(2)  of  the  SPY  ACT  states  that  computer  software  that  would
otherwise  be  considered  an ICP  will  not be  if the  only information  collected  has to  do
with  pages  within  a particular  site and  the  information  is not  made  available  to  people
other than  (i) the provider  of the website accessed  or (ii)  a party authorized  to  facilitate
the  display  or  functionality  of webpages  within  the  site  accessed. The  only  permitted
advertising  delivered  to  or  displayed  on  the  computer  using  this  information  is
advertising  on pages within that particular site.  It is not clear how the SPY ACT will deal
with  information feeds  or new  technologies  (including communication  clients  of various
kinds) whose outputs do not map clearly onto "websites"  or "pages."
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specific English-language  disclosures) and (2)  includes  functions listed  in
the bill.
The  notice  provisions  in  the  SPY  ACT  require  that  ICP  notices  be
clearly  distinguished  from any other information  visually presented  at the
same time on the computer,  and that they contain particular required  texts
in English, for example,  "This program  will collect and transmit informa-
tion about you. Do you accept?"  or "This program will collect information
about Webpages you access  and will use that information  to display adver-
tising on your computer. Do you accept? ' 45 The notice also must provide a
description of the types of information to be collected and sent by the ICP,
an  explanation  of the  purpose  for these  actions,  and  identify  the  ICP  by
name. After the user has consented to execution of the ICP, if the program
is used to collect or transmit materially different information, a second no-
tice  must be  sent and  a  second  consent  must be  obtained.  The  Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) is commanded to issue regulations  on these no-
tice subjects. 46 The FTC is not, however, provided with additional funding
for this drafting work.47
45.  The  required  notices  may  not  communicate  effectively  to  the  10  percent  of
Americans  who  do  not  speak  English.  US  CENSUS  BUREAU,  LANGUAGE  USE  AND
ENGLISH-SPEAKING  ABILITY:  2000,  Oct.  2003,  http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/
c2kbr-29.pdf.  Moreover,  because  the  SPY  ACT potentially  affects  devices  around  the
globe, see infra note  50, Chinese notices may be more appropriate.
46.  The  SPY ACT  is  under the jurisdiction  of the  House  Commerce  Committee,
which  has  been  fiercely  fighting  for  control  over  Intemet-related  issues  with  the
Committee  on  the Judiciary  for several  years. See, e.g.,  House Commerce and Judiciary
Committees  Vie  for  High  Tech  Leadership, TECH  LAW  JOURNAL,  June  15,  1999,
http://www.techlawjournal.com/intelpro/19990616a.htm.  The  Commerce  Committee  has
jurisdiction  over  the  FTC,  and  thus  is  interested  in  making spyware  a deception  issue
subject  to  FTC  rulemaking.  Rep.  Barton  of Texas,  who  chairs  the  House  Commerce
Committee,  has  made  clear  that  spyware  legislation  is  his  top  priority.  Because  Rep.
Barton  is also in charge of rewriting the Telecommunications  Act, it would be politically
unwise  for large  online companies  to challenge his spyware  agenda,  as it may adversely
effect their telecommunications  interests  as  well.  For an exploration  of the implications
of  the  turf  war  between  the  Judiciary  and  Commerce  committees,  see  John  M.
deFigueiredo,  Committee Jurisdiction  and Internet  Intellectual  Property Protection,  May
2002,  http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/2002/defigueiredo_0502.pdf  (describing  jurisdictional
turf wars  between  committees  over  continuing  and  new  issues  can  have  a  profound
impact on the behavior of legislators and the outcomes of policies).
47.  The  SPY  ACT's  anointing  of  the  FTC  as  the  drafter  of  spyware  rules  is
reminiscent  of the FTC's  adventures  in  children's  online  privacy  under  the Children's
Online  Privacy  Protection  Act (COPPA)  of 2000. I  have  noted that  despite  expending
enormous energy  drafting rules  under that  statute, the  FTC has brought very  few cases.
There  is evidence that  some providers of legitimate  interactive  services for children went
out of business rather than attempt to comply with the burdensome  consent requirements
of the  rules.  See Ben  Chamy,  The Cost of COPPA: Kids'  Site Stops  Talking, ZDNET,
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Under the  SPY ACT, all ICPs must allow  the program to  be disabled
easily by a user, and they must ensure that  any triggered advertisement  is
accompanied by the name or logo of the ICP. "Embedded advertisements"
(an  undefined  term)  are  excepted  from  the  latter  requirement.  The  FTC
may  make  rules  about these  functions, but  is not required  to  do  so.  The
SPY ACT provides for fines of up to $3  million for "patterns or practices"
that violate the "bad acts" provisions, and sunsets at the end of 2010.
2.  I-SPYACTof 2005
The  House  Judiciary  Committee  introduced  its own bill, H.R. 744  or
the Internet  Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention  Act of 2005, which passed in the
House  on May  23,  2005.  The bill  avoids  the  regulatory  approach  of the
48
SPY ACT, instead focusing on penalties for actual harm to computers.  It
imposes up to a two-year prison sentence on anyone who uses spyware to
intentionally break into a computer and either alter the computer's security
settings, or obtain personal information with the intent to defraud  or injure
a person or with the intent to damage  a computer. Additionally,  it imposes
up to  a  five-year prison  sentence  on anyone  who  uses  software  to  inten-
tionally break into  a computer  and uses that software in furtherance  of an-
other federal crime.
3.  SPYBLOCKAct
The  Senate  is considering  S.  687,  or the Software  Principles  Yielding
Better  Levels  of  Consumer  Knowledge  Act  (SPY  BLOCK  Act),  co-
Sept.  12,  2000,  http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-523848.html?legacy=zdnn;  Carrie
Kirby,  Youth  Privacy Net Law  Takes Effect, Many  Web Site  Operators Worry  They'll
Lose Money on  Children's Market, SAN  FRANCISCO  CHRONICLE,  Apr.  21,  2000,  at BI,
available at  http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=  /chronicle/archive/2000/04/
21/BU102542.DTL;  Electronic  Privacy  Information  Center,  The  Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act,  http://www.epic.org/privacy/kids  (last  visited  Aug.  19,  2005)
(stating that critics have  claimed that the methods outlined by the FTC for verification-
sending/faxing  printed  forms,  supplement  of  credit  card  numbers,  calling  toll-free
numbers,  and  forwarding  digital  signatures  through  e-mail-are  inadequate  to  protect
personal  information,  as  well  as  prohibitively  costly  and  cumbersome.  Consequently,
children may manipulate information to access  these websites,  and that online businesses
may eliminate children-focused  sites).
48.  I-SPY uses the same broad definition of protected  computers  found in the SPY
ACT-any  "electronic,  magnetic,  optical,  electrochemical,  or  other  high  speed  data
processing  device performing  logical,  arithmetic,  or storage functions,  and includes any
data  storage  facility  or  communications  facility  directly  related  to  or  operating  in
conjunction  with  such  device  . . . which  is  used  in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce  or
communication,  including a computer located  outside the United States  that is used in a
manner  that  affects  interstate  or  foreign  commerce  or  communication  of  the  United
States."  18 U.S.C.A.  §  1030(e)  (West 2005).
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sponsored  by Senator  Bums of Montana  and  Senator Wyden  of Oregon.
This bill has "bad act" elements, but goes beyond the bad acts explored by
state  legislation  to  outlaw  very  general  deceptive  software  acts:  it  is
unlawful  under  the  SPY  BLOCK  Act  to  cause  the  installation  of soft-
ware49 on a  computer 50  in  a manner that conceals  the fact of the installa-
tion of the  software from the user, prevents the user from having an oppor-
tunity  to  grant  or withhold consent  to  the  installation,  or  is the  result  of
inducing the user to consent  to the  installation by means of a misrepresen-
tation;  it is also unlawful to cause the installation of software that prevents
uninstall  efforts.  Given  the definitions of "software"  and  "computer" un-
der  the  SPY  BLOCK Act, it could  potentially  cover  software  associated
with routing communications  across the Internet.
The SPY BLOCK Act states that ads prompted by software  are unlaw-
ful  if they  are  displayed  "without  a  label  or  other  reasonable  means  of
identifying  to the user of the  computer, each time such an advertisement is
displayed, which software caused the advertisement's delivery." 51 The Act
also  contains  some  language  that  appears  to be  trying  to  make unlawful
any software installation that would surprise an end user:
(a) It is unlawful  for a person ...  to-  (1) cause the installation
on that computer  of software  that includes  a surreptitious  infor-
mation collection feature;...
(c).  . .the  term  "surreptitious  information  collection  feature"
means a feature of software that-
(1) collects information  about a user of a protected computer  or
the use of a protected computer by that user, and transmits  such
information to any other person or computer-
(A) [automatically]
(B)  [invisibly] and
(C)  for purposes other than-(i)  facilitating the proper  tech-
nical functioning  of a  capability,  function, or service  that an
authorized  user  of the  computer  has  knowingly  used,  exe-
cuted, or enabled...
(2).. .without  prior notification that-(A) clearly  and  conspicu-
ously discloses to an authorized user of the computer the type  of
information  the  software  will  collect  and the types  of ways the
49.  Under the SPY BLOCK Act, "the  term  'software'  means any program designed
to  cause  a  computer to  perform  a desired  function  or  functions."  S.  687,  109th  Cong.
§ 13(9) (2005).
50.  As in the other federal pieces  of legislation,  "computer"  is defined very  broadly
to include all computers around the world. Id. § 12(8).
51.  Id. §  4(a).
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information  may  be  used  and  distributed"  has  not  been  pro-
vided.52
The FTC is  given authority to promulgate  rules for notifications that soft-
ware will have to provide  in order to avoid being categorized as  a "surrep-
titious information  collection feature. 53  Preemption provided by the SPY
BLOCK  Act  is narrower  than  in  the other  federal  bills,  and covers  only
state legislation or regulation that deals  with software  installed  or used to
collect information  or present ads, or prescribes  specific methods  for pro-
viding notification before the installation of software on a computer.
54
It is likely that the Senate will pass the  SPY BLOCK Act with a crimi-
nal  amendment.  The  differences  among  the  SPY  BLOCK,  I-SPY,  and
SPY  ACT  bills  will  be  worked  out  in  conference  committee  meetings.
These  bills  are  marching  towards  passage  with  virtually  no  opposition,
which is not surprising because it is difficult to lobby against a bill labeled
as fixing the problem of "spyware."
E.  Implications of Pending Legislation
1.  Implication One: Design Mandates
To the extent these bills deal with deceptive "bad acts" that are widely
viewed  as  harmful  spying, they  are  likely  duplicative  of existing  unfair
trade  practices  laws and unlikely  to pose problems  for future  innovation.
The  I-SPY ACT  falls within this category,  as do the "bad acts"  bills  (in-
cluding the first section  of the SPY  ACT) that focus  on software  that de-
ceptively "takes contiol" of a computer or uses keystroke loggers. Because
the  deceptive  use  of software  is  outlawed  under these  bills,  not the  soft-
ware itself, they may have the salutary effect of pushing the FTC to bring
cases  against  clearly  bad  actors.  But bills that broaden  the  definition  of
"spyware"  to include software  that gathers  information about the websites
visited  by  a  user,  or  software  that  somehow  surprises  a  user  (as  in  the
pending  SPY  BLOCK  Act),  or  software  that triggers  contextual  ads  or
web content based on user activity or use of unauthorized search terms (as
in the revised Utah bill and the  other state "trademark"  bills), and require
''notice"  to  be  given  to  consumers  before  such  software  can  be  legally
used,  constitute  technical design  mandates  focused  on the  software  itself
rather than legislation about deceptive behavior.
52.  Id. §  3.
53.  Id. §  7(b).
54.  Id. § 10.2005]
For example,  under  the  proposed  SPY  ACT,  all  "information  collec-
tion programs"  must provide  "notice"  and include  required  functions  in
order  to  be  considered  lawful."  Information  collection  programs  are
broadly  defined  to  include  software  that "collects  information  regarding
the Web pages accessed using the  computer"  and "uses  such information
to deliver advertising to, or display advertising  on, the computer."56 In or-
der to avoid falling  into the  hole of "spyware"  liability, software  meeting
these broad definitions  must provide  elaborate  disclosures  in English  and
obtain consent from users.  Similarly, the  SPY BLOCK Act makes illegal
"surreptitious  information  collection  features"  that  without notice  to  the
user  collect  information  and  use  it for  purposes  that  might  surprise  the
user, and outlaws  software that causes  ads to be displayed without  labels
of various  kinds. All of the  "trademark"  state  bills and "notice"  bills re-
quire notices and labels for liability to be avoided. Broadly stated, because
these pending bills require  functions,  labels,  and notices  to be  applied to
software,  whether or not the software  coder feels it is a good idea to have
such  notices  in place  or the  advertiser  wants  a label  plastered  on  its  ad,
they are design mandates.
In conversation,  people  will  say  clearly  that they think  "spyware"  is
bad. We can  all agree  that  the  kinds of bad acts  addressed by these  bills
constitute  behavior  that  should  be  punished.  Deceptive  hijacking  of the
browser  function,  deceptive  phishing,  and  deceptive  installation  of soft-
ware are  all things we can  be confident  are wrong. These provisions  will
not  slow  the  course  of innovation.  But  defining  "spyware"  in  terms  of
broad categories  of functions  plus  absence of "notice"  (and  clickthrough
"assent") is a step legislatures should not take lightly, for several reasons.
First, the definition could be over-inclusive. Many of these broadly de-
fined functions are in fact things that users now and in the future may want
to  have happen  invisibly.  For example,  Yahoo!  is offering  a  deeply con-
textual  search  function-Y!Q-that  users  can  place  on  their  own  web-
sites.57 When text is highlighted on  that page,  and the  search  function  is
triggered,  the  search  results  respond  to  the  text  in  context  on  the  page.
What  if Y!Q  also  included  ad  results  in  exchange  for the  free  service?
Would that be "spyware"  under one of these bills? Would users then have
to  see  only labeled  ads,  or respond  to notices  in order to  get the  search
function at all?
55.  SPY ACT,  108th Cong. § 3 (2004).
56.  Id.
57.  See Yahoo!  Search  Help:  Y!Q  Search,  http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/ysearch-
/yq/index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
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Similarly, Google  is now  offering  an updated  version of the popular
Google Toolbar that allows users to highlight text on any webpage and be
sent  directly  to another site--even  though the author of the webpage  did
not insert  a  link in  the  underlying  text.  8  In  effect,  Google  is adding  its
own links to pages, starting initially with U.S. addresses as the highlighted
text that goes to Google-chosen  maps. Google tracks and logs the informa-
tion gathered through  this process,  including  pages visited, searches  cho-
sen,  form information filled-in,  and the  IP address of the visitor, and can
link that information to whatever a Google registrant has done with his or
her Gmail account. Google can then use this information to trigger highly-
focused  ads that are  presented to the  user in  Gmail or  other contextually
relevant places.59 Would a user be surprised by this functionality?  Should
the Google Toolbar-generated  ads  be accompanied  by various  labels that
make it clear what software  triggered these  ads? What if the user's use of
the  Google  Toolbar  generated just  a  drop  of data  in an  ocean  of other
Google-gathered  information that triggered these ads?60
SideStep, which bills itself as "the traveler's search engine,"  accompa-
nies users as they shop for travel services online.  When a  user is about to
58.  Anita  Hamilton,  Google Tricks,  TIME  MAGAZINE,  Mar.  7,  2005,  http://www.
time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1032364,00.html.
59.  In  2004,  Google  filed  a  declaratory  judgment  action  against  American  Blind
based on  American  Blind's threats  of suit  arising  out of Google's  keyword  advertising
practices.  Google,  Inc.  v.  Am. Blind  & Wallpaper  Factory,  Inc.,  No.  C03-5340,  2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27601  (N.D. Cal.  Apr. 8,  2004).  In March 2005,  the Northern  District
refused to  grant Google's  motion to  dismiss  American  Blind's trademark  infringement
and  dilution  claims,  stating  that  American  Blind  might  be  able  to  show  actionable
trademark "use"  based on purchase of keywords by Google  advertisers.  Google, Inc.  v.
Am. Blind  & Wallpaper  Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340  JF, 2005  U.S. Dist. LEXIS  6228
(March  30,  2005).  Judge Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia recently issued a
decision  concerning  Google's  use  of  keywords  to  trigger  advertisements.  Geico  v.
Google,  Inc.,  No.  1:04cv507  (E.D. Va.  Aug.  8,  2005)  (holding  that while  mere  use  of
keywords  to  trigger  advertisements  does  not  constitute  trademark  infringement,
advertisements  that  reference  trademarks  in  their  headings  or  text  may  infringement
trademarks).
60.  eBay also  has a toolbar that knows  where you are on  the eBay network  of sites
(including PayPal) at all  times, and where  you are when you  have left that network.  The
eBay toolbar also  includes  an  "Account  Guard"  feature that warns  users (using  colors)
when they are on potentially fraudulent-spoofed--eBay  or PayPal  sites, and when they
are on non-eBay sites.  Users can report sites  that they believe  to be spoof sites,  and that
information will be reviewed by eBay and made  part of the toolbar functioning  if the tip
is found to be accurate. Regarding  this  issue, eBay's  Frequently Asked Questions  states
that the eBay toolbar is not spyware.  eBay Frequently  Asked  Questions,  eBay Toolbar
With Account Guard, http://pages.ebay.com/help/announcement/4.html  (last visited  Aug.
30, 2005).
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purchase  a plane ticket, a narrow SideStep  box slides  out from the side of
the user's screen,  letting the  user know that better deals  on the  same trip
are available from  different companies.61 Many  more SideStep-like  appli-
cations will emerge  in the months and years to come, accompanying users
to provide  comparison  shopping  and trust/verification  services.  Some  of
these  services may not provide  notices of any  kind, and  may be  installed
invisibly  when  a  user  elects  a  particular  network  of  relationships  or
chooses a particular provider of online access. These applications will help
users  understand  and  organize  the  overwhelming  wealth  of information
available  online.  They  will certainly be tracking  what users  see and what
users'  preferences  are, and they will have extensive  information  about us-
ers'  offline activities. Will we call these applications "spyware,"  and claim
that they  are  unlawful  if they  do not  communicate  particular  prescribed
notices and labels? Many of these applications  are or will be  free, and us-
ers want to continue having access to helpful free software.62
Cookies, text files that are sent by a webserver to a user's browser, are
generally not considered spyware because they can only be read by the site
that sent them. Thus, cookies do not track user activity  across their entire
web  experience.  But many major websites allow network advertisers,  like
DoubleClick  and AvenueA,  to place  cookies on users'  browsers  and col-
late  the  information  gathered  for  purposes  of targeted  advertising.  The
more  sites  that  are  served  by  these  network  advertisers,  the  richer  and
more sophisticated their databases  of user activities become. Are these so-
called "third party cookies"  spyware  that should be unlawful without  no-
tices and labels? Are users (or computers)  harmed by well-targeted ads?63
Second,  requiring  these  broad  categories  of sometimes-helpful  soft-
ware to provide notices (and obtain traceable  consent to these notices) and
include  required  functions,  such  as  uninstallation  features  and  readily-
available  information links, will greatly constrain the freedom of software
designers. I am not arguing that facially unlawful  software that does noth-
ing  but  perform  intrusive  bad acts  (like  spreading  viruses,  or  installing
61.  See  SideStep:  The  Traveler's  Search  Engine,  http://www.SideStep.com/html/
about_.SideStep/main.html  (last visited Aug.  19, 2005).
62.  See  2005  Spyware  Study,  May  12,  2005,  http://www.networkadvertising.org/
spyware-forum/2005_Consumer  SpywareSurvey_NAI_051205.pdf  (reporting  national
survey of 2000 Internet  users and showing  most people  download  free  software  and do
not  want  new  anti-spyware  laws  to  prevent  them  from  being  able  to  download  such
software).
63.  Updating  virus control requires "spyware,"  and parental controls  (settings that a
user can alter to block particular kinds  of content  from being accessed by members of a
household)  raise  some of the  same  concerns.  Both  require "monitoring"  of the  use of a
computer; both might surprise users; neither is malicious.
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Trojan  horses,  or changing a PC's settings)  should be  legal. I  am  saying,
however, that new software applications  with both "spying"  and "serving"
elements  may  be  developed.  Right  now,  enhanced  search  toolbars  and
third-party  cookies both spy and serve.  It is unclear what will happen next
in the world of legitimate  software development-and  requiring particular
features  and  the  provision  and tracking  of "notice"  will  inevitably  con-
strain some developers from doing inventive things that users might like.64
Indeed,  it may be  that  laws  mandating particular  forms of code  (and
the application of labels and notices to this code)  are unconstitutional.  We
can protect code  (from  copyright  and  patent  infringement  and  from  cir-
65 cumvention),  and prevent code by law from being exported (if it uses an
encryption  algorithm that exceeds certain limits), 66 but only when the gov-
ernment  is acting as a customer (or funder) can it mandate that code have
particular  attributes. 67 Otherwise,  design mandates  become  government-
facilitated  upstream  censorship--something  that  is  inconsistent with  free
speech values.
Requiring the use of particular labels  and notices is  arguably  a viola-
tion of the First Amendment  right "to  refrain from  speaking at  all."68  As
the  Supreme  Court  put it  in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
North Carolina, "Mandating  speech  that  a  speaker  would  not  otherwise
make  necessarily  alters the  content of the  speech.  We therefore  consider
64.  The use  of voluntary privacy  notices has  had good effects  on  data  practices in
the U.S.,  because  such statements  give the FTC and its state  counterparts ways to attack
data  practices that  do not match the promises  made  in  these privacy  notices.  Professor
Pam  Samuelson  has  suggested  that,  similarly,  mandatory  notices  for  digital  rights
management  (DRM)  might  have good effects for  consumers. Pam  Samuelson,  A Notice
Requirement  for DMCA Anti-Circumvention  Rules, paper presented at Modest Proposals
2.0 Conference at Cardozo Law School (Feb. 24-25, 2005). But mandatory notices, either
for  DRM  or for software  that some  legislatures  would consider  "spyware"  would  raise
constitutional concerns as well as pose threats to innovation. See supra II.D.i.
65.  Digital Millennium  Copyright  Act,  17  U.S.C.  §§  1201-1205  (2005);  Dennis S.
Karjala,  Distinguishing  Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35  CONN.  L.  REV.  439
(2003).
66.  Export  controls  on  commercial  encryption  products  are  administered  by  the
Bureau  of Industry  and  Security  of the U.S.  Department  of Commerce.  15  C.F.R.  pts.
730-74 (2004).
67.  Compare  U.S.  v.  Am.  Library  Ass'n,  539  U.S.  194  (2003)  (discussing
Children's  Internet  Protection  Act,  requiring  public  libraries  to  use  Internet filters  as  a
condition of receiving  federal funding, not violative of First Amendment),  with Ashcroft
v.  ACLU,  124  S. Ct.  2783  (2004)  (discussing  the  Child  Online  Protection  Act  and
holding that imposing  fines and prison terms for knowingly posting  web content that is
harmful to  minors for "commercial  purposes"  is likely  unconstitutional because  it is not
the least restrictive means available to protect children).
68.  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.  705,  714 (1977).
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[such legislation]  as a content-based regulation of speech., 69 Although it is
true that commercial  speech  receives  less protection  than noncommercial
speech, 7 0 and that disclosures  can be required to  keep commercial  speech
from  being  deceptive,71  it  is not at  all  clear that  software  is  commercial
speech.
The  Supreme  Court  provided  three  factors  that  identify  commercial
speech when existing in combination:  (1) advertisement;  (2) mentioning  a
specific product by name;  and (3)  economically-motivated  speech. 72 Soft-
ware  transmitted  to  users  and  networks  does  not  necessarily  meet  this
standard.  Source  code  has  been held to be  expressive  and thus protected
by the First  Amendment.73 Sweeping  online "notice"  and  "consent"  laws
do  not  seem  adequately  tailored  to  address  problems  with  data  privacy
when offline  data practices  are  left untouched-under  either  the  interme-
diate  scrutiny  ap4 plied to  commercial  speech or the  strict scrutiny  applied
to pure  speech.  And even if software  is commercial  speech,  spyware  is
not necessarily  misleading or part of an illegal activity-the threshold in-
quiry for regulation  of commercial speech  under Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v.  Public Service  Commission.75  As  the  Court  has  said,
"Our  recent  decisions  involving  commercial  speech  have  been grounded
in  the  faith  that  the  free  flow  of commercial  information  is  valuable
enough  to  justify  imposing  on  would-be  regulators  the  costs  of distin-
guishing the truthful  from the  false, the  helpful from the misleading,  and
the harmless from the harmful. 76
69.  487 U.S.  781,  795  (1988);  see also Eugene  Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Information Privacy:  The  Troubling Implications of a Right  to  Stop  People from
Speaking  About You,  52  STAN. L. REv.  1049 (2000).
70.  Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
71.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary  Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651  (1985).
72.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.  Corp., 463  U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983)  (striking  down
ban on mailings of contraceptive  ads).
73.  Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000).
74.  Boos v. Barry,  485 U.S.  312,  321  (1988)  (applying  the strict scrutiny  standard,
which requires the government to show a compelling interest in restricting the speech and
that the restriction  is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve that end);  Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp.  v. Pub.  Serv. Commc'n, 447 U.S.  557, 564  (1980)  (stating that under
intermediate scrutiny, regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest).
75.  447 U.S. at 564.
76.  Zauderer,  471 U.S. at 646.
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Third, users77 may not actually want to know everything  that their ma-
chines are doing. Since the demise of the command line, the graphical user
interface  has  been  piling  abstractions  on top  of abstractions  and  hiding
more and  more functionality  from the user.  7HTML, after all,  is itself an
invisible  function of computer software, telling the browser how to render
particular code  visible  to the user. It is code  transmitted to and executed
within  the  user's  browser  without  the  user's  permission  or  knowledge.
JavaScript,  similarly,  is  used  by  web  designers  to  make  HTML  pages
more  dynamic.  It  is  also  sent  to  the  client  as  text  and executed  in  the
browser without the user's permission or knowledge.  Several of the pend-
ing  bills  (including  the  SPY  ACT)  suggest  that computer  software  that
collects information about webpages  accessed  by the computer,  or that is
executed or installed without the user's knowledge,  is potentially  spyware
that requires  notice  and  consent. How much  of this approval  process  do
users want to be involved  in? Would users  like to know every time some-
thing "happens"  inside their computer, and give approval to it?79 Probably
not. Users who  set their browsers  to "not  accept cookies  without permis-
sion" end up having terrible usage experiences,  because they have to click
to agree over and over again in order to sustain a single session on a single
website.
Fourth,  insisting  on  "notice  and  consent"  for  broadly-defined  "spy-
ware" will lead to a hopelessly impoverished and meaningless regime. No
one will understand what  a "yes"  click means,  and most people will sim-
ply  click through as  much  as possible in  order to be  allowed to  continue
the session. If a "yes"  is answered  to  the question "do you consent to the
collection  of information  about  your  web  browsing  session,"  then  that
"yes" does not signal that the user understands how that collected informa-
77.  Although  policy discussions  surrounding  the spyware bills concern  "users"  and
"consumers,"  the  bills  deal  with  electronic  devices  generally  (worldwide)  and
"authorized  users"  of  those  devices.  These  "authorized  users"  could  be  systems
administrators  or network operators.
78.  See  generally  M.  MITCHELL  WALDROP,  THE  DREAM  MACHINE:  J.C.R.
LICKLIDER AND THE REVOLUTION  THAT MADE  COMPUTING PERSONAL (2001).
79.  Perhaps  for this reason,  a recent  revision  of the  SPY  ACT  exempts  particular
kinds of "computer  software"  from the notice provisions of the bill. If the software is (a)
only  collecting  information  about  what  pages  have  been  accessed  inside  a  particular
website,  (b) does not  send information  to  someone  other  than the website operator, and
(c)  does  not prompt advertising  other  than ads  on  the  webpages  within  that particular
website,  it will not be considered an ICP.  E-mail  from David Cavicke,  General Counsel
and Chief Counsel  for Commerce  Trade and Consumer Protection, House Committee  on
Energy and Commerce (Mar.  11,  2005,  17:46:26)  (on file with the author). This language
is  designed  to  exempt  "HTML  and Java  when  either  performs  ordinary  functions  like
constructing Web pages,"  according to House staff. Id.
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tion may be used from that moment to the end of time. It would be impos-
sible to explain the consequences  of a single "yes" without writing a novel
and  sending  it for approval  to the  user. To  the  extent these  "yes"  clicks
represent  assent to  a contract  of adhesion,  that  contract will  rise  and  fall
based  on  its  reasonableness,  not  on  the  presence  or  absence  of a user's
click.80  In effect, the government will be requiring users to click helplessly
along,  assenting  to  something  they  do  not  understand  over  and  over
again 81  This  is  more  like  forced  speech  ("CLICK!  CLICK!")  than  con-
sumer protection.  Labeling  generated  ads to  signal  what  software  gener-
ated them is also a largely meaningless pursuit. Why will this information
make  any difference to the consumer?  Wouldn't the consumer be happier
managing  his/her own user experience  by using tools  that block pop-ups,
rather than gathering over and over again the empty knowledge  of the ad's
origin?
In sum, these  design  mandate  elements of the  pending  legislative  ef-
forts should be understood  for what they really are:  reflections of an over-
all desire to control the online world. Although this set of issues is coming
up in a context that many find "easy"-as there are few lobbyists  for spy-
ware-enacting  these technical mandates should not be easy steps for leg-
islators to take.  There  is in the world today an enormous push for control
over the Internet generally8 2 that uses fear of online threats to  fuel its pro-
gress.  In the  copyright wars,  we see  a  drive  for technical  mandates  con-
straining  devices  (the broadcast  flag)  and requiring notices  and redesigns
of general  purpose  software  that  might be  used  for  copyright  infringe-
ment.8 3 Staff to  senators have said that software should be  subject to a re-
gime similar to products liability  law, and be redesigned to  avoid the risk
of infringement  and labeled to warn users of the potential for such risks.8 4
80.  See ProCD,  Inc.  v. Zeidenberg,  86  F.3d  1447  (7th  Cir.  1996)  (holding  that  a
software licensor can bind purchasers  by: (1) providing  notice of a license  to a consumer
at the moment of licensing, and (2)  providing the license terms and conditions following
the  moment  of license);  M/S  Bremen  v.  Zapata  Off-Shore  Co.,  407  U.S.  1 (1972);
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S.  595 (1991).
81.  And if software  manufacturers  are providing notice and collecting consent,  how
will they know who consented to what without collecting and maintaining a great deal of
personally-identifiable  information?  The privacy implications of these bills have not been
explored-at least not publicly.
82.  See  Susan  P.  Crawford,  The  Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25  HASTINGS
COMM.  & ENT.  L.J.  603  (2003);  Susan  P.  Crawford,  Shortness of Vision: Regulatory
Ambition in the Digital  Age, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
83.  See MGM  Studios, Inc.  v. Grokster, Ltd.,  125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780-81  (2005).
84.  Tom  Sydnor,  S. Comm.  on  the Judiciary  staff member  for  Sen.  Orrin  Hatch,
Public Statement at The Modest Proposals  2.0 Conference  at Cardozo  Law  School  (Feb.
25, 2005).
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Similarly,  the FBI  would  like to  subject  new  online  applications  to pre-
approval  regimes,  to ensure  that they  are easily tappable by  law enforce-
ment (and  redesigned  if they are  not).85 And  the telecommunications  in-
dustry  would  like to  see  broad  application  of "consumer  privacy"  man-
dates  to  IP-enabled  services,86 including  required notices,  labels,  and all
the  rest. Notices,  labels,  and design mandates  for  software  designated  as
"spyware"  fit into  this  larger  desire  by  incumbents  for  control  over the
high-tech industry, and represent a first crucial step down this path.
This may sound like an overstatement. "Why, no," you say to yourself.
"There  are no black  helicopters here.  All we're trying to  do is lessen the
scourge  of spyware.  Surely you can't  suggest that great incumbent indus-
tries-law enforcement, content, and telecommunications-are  behind this
legislative effort so as to gain further control over software development."
I agree that consumer protection is a key goal for lawmaking, and I am
confident  that most  legislators  are  being  pushed  by their relatives  to  do
something  about spyware. But this  spyware battle presents an opportunity
for  specific design power  to  be asserted over code  in a way  we have not
yet seen.  I would not be concerned if the  legislation under consideration
dealt only with "bad acts"  that most people  agree constitute  spying.  Tak-
ing  this  step  seems  wholly  appropriate,  and  not  worth  an  alarmist  re-
sponse.  The insertion of notice  and  labeling mandates, by contrast, raises
red flags and signals a shift in our understanding of what code is.
If code needs notice  and labeling,  it must be  something that otherwise
could  be subject  to product  liability claims  for failure  to  warn.88 But be-
cause  direct physical  injury  is  not caused  by  software,  it  should  not be
85.  Joint  Reply  Comments  of Industry and  Public Interest, In re Communications
Assistance  for  Law  Enforcement  Act and  Broadband  Access  and  Services,  ET  Docket
No. 04-295  (FCC Dec. 21,  2004).
86.  In re IP-Enabled Servs.,  19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (proposed Feb.  12,  2004).
87.  See A. Michael Froomkin,  The Metaphor  is the Key: Cryptography,  The Clipper
Chip, and The Constitution, 143  U. PA.  L.  REv. 709,  718-34  (1995)  (describing  uses of
encryption  technology to protect communications  and provide data security).
88.  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF TORTS: PRODUCTS  LIABILITY  § 2 (1998)  breaks down
the  definition  into  three  distinct  areas:  (1) Manufacturing  Defects-when  the  product
departs  from  its  intended  design,  even  if all  possible  care  was  exercised;  (2)  Design
Defects-when  the  foreseeable  risks  of harm  posed  by  the product  could  have  been
reduced or avoided by the  adoption of a reasonable  alternative  design, and failure to use
the  alternative  design  renders  the  product  not  reasonably  safe;  and  (3)  Inadequate
Instructions  or  Warnings  Defects-when  the  foreseeable  risks  of harm  posed  by  the
product could have been reduced  or avoided by reasonable  instructions or warnings, and
their  omission  renders  the  product  not  reasonably  safe.  The  design  defects  approach
seems to have been adopted with respect to code, at least in dicta, by Judge Posner in the
Aimster decision.  In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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treated  under  a products  liability regime-which  traditionally  focuses  on
tangible  rather  than  intangible  products.  When  we  think  of "products"
whose  manufacturers  should be  liable  for  "failure  to warn,"  we  think  of
chairs,  or power  tools,  and  so does the  Restatement  (Second)  of Torts.
89
Software is much more like speech than it is a product.9 0 It is not clear that
rendering  code  subject to  "failure  to warn"  standards  would  improve  the
quality of software.91 And it would undoubtedly constrain  what new code
is allowed to do, limit user experiences,  and lead to a flurry of inexplicable
notices and labels92 that might drive people away from the online world.
Because legislation is primarily a one-way ratchet,93 should "spyware"
notice  and  labeling  bills  pass  legislatures  will  be  in the business  of de-
manding more and different notices and labels: "This  software may permit
copies to  be  made.  WARNING."  or  "This  software  allows  you  to  meet
89.  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TORTS § 402A (1979)  (providing the. framework  for
products liability law);  see also Winter v.  G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033,  1034 (9th
Cir. 1991)  ("The purposes served by products liability law..,  are focused on the tangible
world....").
90.  The  Magnuson-Moss  Warranty-Federal  Trade  Commission  Improvements
Act,  15 U.S.C.  §§ 2301-2312 (2000), which establishes  minimum standards for consumer
product  warranties,  may  apply  to  software  sold  to  consumers.  I  attended  an  FTC
workshop in October 2000 at which the applicability of Magnuson-Moss  to software  was
discussed, and there was no answer as to whether it did or did not.
91.  See Jeffrey Neuberger  & Maureen Garde, Information Security Vulnerabilities:
Should We Litigate or Mitigate?, 21  Andrews  Computer & Internet Litig. Rep.  13  (Mar.
2004) ("On the face of events,  it appears that limiting liability for software  defects may
have been part of the solution to the Y2K problem  .... Perhaps the  economic resources
that  would have  been  devoted to  litigating  Y2K  issues went  instead to mitigating  Y2K
problems.").
92.  Compare  the  experience  of consumers  with  required  financial privacy  notices
under Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley  Act,  15  U.S.C.  §§ 6801-6809  (2000). That Act
requires  that  financial  institutions  provide  certain  disclosures  regarding  their  privacy
policies and provide opt-out opportunities before releasing  information about individuals
to  third  parties.  Most  experts  agree  that  these  notices  are  viewed  by  consumers  as
meaningless,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  existence  of  these  notices  has  led  to
increased privacy. And at least one "readability consultant"  has concluded that consumers
are unable to read and understand these notices. Mark Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print:
Readability of Financial  Privacy Notices, PRIVACY  RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE,  July 2001,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-Reading.htm.
93.  For  example,  in  the  Uniting  and  Strengthening  America  by  Providing
Appropriate  Tools  required  to  Intercept  and  Obstruct  Terrorism  Act  of  2001  (USA
PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No.  107-56,  115  Stat. 272, Congress made substantial changes to
the  1978  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  (FISA),  Pub.  L. No.  95-511,  92  Stat.
1783.  Although there is a sunset provision for these FISA changes  in § 224 of the Patriot
Act scheduled for December  31,  2005,  it is very unlikely  that we will return  to pre-9/11
standards for foreign intelligence surveillance.
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strangers  and  converse  with  them.  Do  you  REALLY  WANT  TO  DO
THIS?"
2.  Implication Two: Lack of  Efficacy
Even with all the elements  of the previously discussed approaches  ad-
dressing  spyware-notices,  design  mandates,  and bad  acts-written  into
legislative  language, will federal  spyware  legislation work?  The clear an-
swer  is  "no."  Although  legitimate  software  distributors  who  routinely
comply  with law  will provide  notices  and  constrain  their design  efforts,
rogue  spyware  sources will  simply move offshore  and continue  their  de-
ceptive work,  or  stay in  the  U.S.  and design  around  the  rules.  This  has
been  our  experience  to  date  with  the  Controlling  the  Assault  of Non-
Solicited  Pornography  and  Marketing  Act  of 2003  (CAN-SPAM  Act)
94
legislation of mid-December  2003. 95
The most important element of CAN-SPAM,  like the pending  federal
spyware bills, is that it preempts  state anti-spain measures that are not di-
rectly  related  to fraud  or  deception.96  Several  states  (most notably,  Cali-
fornia, with an "opt-in"  bill that was scheduled to take effect on January  1,
2004)  had  enacted  statutes  that  were  extremely  restrictive,  and  CAN-
SPAM  was  designed  to  avoid  the  complexities  of complying  with  fifty
different state laws.
CAN-SPAM  does not outlaw the sending of unsolicited commercial e-
mail. Instead, it prohibits some  fraudulent and misleading practices  (such
as misleading header information), requires senders to label their messages
as commercial,  and requires that senders give recipients a means to opt out
of communications.97 The  labeling  scheme  of CAN-SPAM  requires  that
senders  provide  in  each  message  a  "clear  and  conspicuous  identification
that the message  is an advertisement  or solicitation." 98 The Act is enforced
by  the  FTC,99  criminal  prosecutions  (with  penalties  ranging  up  to  five
94.  Pub. L. No.  108-187,  117 Stat. 2699.
95.  See Press  Release,  The  White  House,  Fact Sheet:  President  Bush  Signs  Anti-
Spare  Law  (Dec.  16,  2003),  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/1
2/2003
1216-4.html; Tom Zeller, Law Barring  Junk E-Mail Allows a Flood Instead,  N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2005,  at A2.
96.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7708(b) (Supp. 2004).
97.  CAN-SPAM Act,  § 5(a)(3).
98.  Id. § 5(a)(5)(A)(i)'.
99.  Id. § 7(a).
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years  in  prison), 1 00  actions  by  state  attorneys  general, 1 0'  and  suits  by
ISPs.
102
Unsolicited e-mail on the Internet has actually increased since the pas-
sage of CAN-SPAM, and now amounts to 80 percent or more of all e-mail
sent, up  from 60  percent during  the period  before  the  law  went  into ef-
fect.' °3  It  appears  that  the  greatest  impact  of CAN-SPAM  has  been  to
cause  legitimate  businesses  heartaches  as  they  try  to  avoid  falling  into
some  of the  ambiguous traps  that  statute  creates.  Spammers, meanwhile,
have  changed  their tactics  since  CAN-SPAM  was  enacted,  and  are  now
using  "zombies  networks"  (computers  hijacked  with  trojan  horse  pro-
grams, according to PC World) to send spam.'0  Nearly half of the world's
sparn  is  said  to  come  from  the  U.S.105  CAN-SPAM  has  neither made  it
easier to find spammers nor decreased the amount of spam.
Some may argue that CAN-SPAM was a toothless  alternative  to  state
opt-in bills, such as the California measure that CAN-SPAM  was designed
to preempt, and that federal spyware  legislation could be made more effec-
tive than CAN-SPAM.1 0 6 Spyware relationships  leave a direct money trail
that can be  more  easily followed  than span operations,  making  it poten-
tially easier to  police than spam.  But both CAN-SPAM  and the  spyware
bills attempt  to do the  same thing:  control the flow of bits through law, in
a  world  in  which  it  is  very  difficult  both  to  tell  who  is responsible  for
which  bits  and  to  locate  these  sources  physically  for  enforcement  pur-
poses.
100.  See, e.g.,  Associated  Press, Spam senders convicted in first  felony case, Nov. 3,
2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6401091  (noting that the court sentenced spammers
to nine years in prison plus fines).
101.  CAN-SPAM Act,  § 7(f).
102.  Id. § 7(g).
103.  Zeller, supra note 95;  Grant Gross,  Is CAN-SPAM  Working? One year After it
Went Into Effect, Many Say  The Nation's Antispam Law is Ineffective, PC WORLD,  Dec.
28,  2004,  http://www.pcworld.com/news/Article/0,aid, 1  19058,00.asp  (reporting  Postini
claim that legitimate nonspam e-mail was down to  12 percent in December 2004 and MX
Logic claim that 25 percent of all e-mail was legitimate as of November 2004).
104.  Gross, supra note 103.
105.  Dan  Ilet,  U.S. Leads the Dirty Dozen  Spammers, CNET  NEWS.COM,  Dec.  24,
2004,  http://news.com.comlU.S.+leads+the+dirty+dozen+spammers/2100-7349_3-5503
344.html.
106.  Chris Hoofnagle  of the Electronic Privacy Information Center made this point at
a  February  19,  2005  conference,  "Real  Law  and  Online  Rights,"  sponsored  by  the
Virginia  Journal  of Law  and  Technology  at  the University  of Virginia.  Hoofnagle  has
argued that the past decade of self-regulation  has led to the spyware epidemic.  Chris Jay
Hoofnagle,  Privacy Self-Regulation: A  Decade of Disappointment,  EPIC.ORG,  Mar.  4,
2005, http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.html.
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Additionally,  none  of the  spyware  bills  that are  under  consideration
create  any new  funding  for  agency enforcement  of their mandates.  Real
spyware-the  truly harmful  kind,  not the  broadly  defined  kind--comes
from people  who  are  completely  dedicated  to  breaking  the  law.  Without
enforcement funding, and with the real difficulties involved in finding and
prosecuting  spyware  sources,  the  spyware  picture  is  unlikely  to  be
changed by new  federal laws.  And international  spyware  sources will, of
course, be completely unaffected.
3.  Implication Three: A  Complicated  Relationship With Existing
Laws
In response  to  the  spyware  epidemic,  some  have  strongly  suggested
that spyware be addressed as a privacy issue.'0 7 In connection with pend-
ing federal  spyware bills, and at the urging of legislators, public advocacy
groups  have  testified  in  favor of "baseline"  privacy  legislation,  whereby
fair  information  practices
1 0 8  (including notice,  consent, access,  and secu-
rity) would be required of all U.S. online participants.' 
09
107.  See Editorial,  The Spies in  Your  Computer, N.Y. TIMES,  February  18,  2004,  at
Al  (arguing  that "Congress  will  miss  the point  [in  spyware  legislation]  if it  regulates
specific varieties of spyware, only to watch the programs mutate into forms  that evade  a
narrowly  tailored  law.  A  better  solution,  as  proposed  recently  by  the  Center  for
Democracy and Technology,  is to develop  privacy standards  that protect computer users
from all programs that covertly collect information that rightfully belongs to the user").
108.  An  exhaustive  discussion  of  the  history  and  meaning  of  the  phrase  "fair
information  practices"  is  beyond  the  scope  of this  Article.  See generally Secretary's
Advisory Comm. on Automated Personal  Data Systems, U.S.  Dep't. of Health,  Educ. &
Welfare,  Records,  Computers, and the  Rights  of Citizens  viii  (1973)  (stating  five
principles of fair information practices:  no data record-keeping  systems should be  secret;
access should be by subject;  information obtained for one purpose should not be used for
another purpose without  consent; correction should be by subject; reliability and security
of  data  is  required);  ORGANISATION  FOR  ECONOMIC  CO-OPERATION  AND  DEV.,
RECOMMENDATION  OF  THE  COUNCIL  CONCERNING  GUIDELINES  GOVERNING  THE
PROTECTION  OF  PRIVACY  AND  TRANSBORDER  FLOWS  OF  PERSONAL  DATA,  Sept.  23,
1980,  O.E.C.D.  Doc.  C(80)58  Final,  reprinted in  20  I.L.M.  422  (1981)  (stating  eight
similar  principles);  Council  Directive  95/46  of 24  October  1995  on  the Protection  of
Individuals with Regard  to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement  of
Such  Data,  1995  O.J.  (L  281)  (granting  right of access  to  personal  data, right to know
where  data  originated,  right  for inaccurate  data  to  be rectified,  right of recourse  in the
event  of unlawful  processing,  and right  to  withhold  permission  to  use  data  in  certain
circumstances).
109.  See,  e.g.,  Combating Spyware: H.R.  29, the SPY ACT: Hearing Before the H.
Comm.  on Energy and Commerce,  109th  Cong.  (2005)  (testimony  of Ari  Schwartz,
Associate  Director,  CDT),  • available  at  http://www.cdt.org/testimony/200501
26
schwartz.pdf;  Spyware:  Hearing Before the  S. Subcomm.  on  Communications of the
Comm.  on  Commerce,  Science,  and Transportation, 108th  Cong.  (2004)  (prepared
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This  approach looks at spyware  from the wrong  end of the telescope.
Although  the  scope  of any constitutional  "right to  privacy"  is hotly  dis-
puted, l   such rights are  fundamentally grounded in notions of property."'
People have a right to privacy in their houses and effects, because a man's
home is his castle. 12 When the subject for "privacy"  is data about interac-
tions between a user and his/her computer,  or interactions between  a com-
puter and  online resources,1 3  it is  very  difficult to  define  the  "property"
statement of Jerry Berman, President,  CDT), available at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/
20040323berman.pdf  ("Fundamental  to the issue of spyware  is the overarching  concern
about  online  Internet  privacy.  Legislation  to  address  the  collection  and  sharing  of
information  on  the  Internet  would  resolve  many  of  the  privacy  issues  raised  by
spyware.").
110.  See  Kyllo  v.  United  States,  533  U.S.  27,  40  (2001)  (stating  that  when  "the
Government uses  a device that is not in general public use, to explore details  of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance
is  a  'search'  and  is presumptively  unreasonable  without a  warrant");  Village  of Belle
Terre  v.  Boraas,  416  U.S.  1,  13  (1974)  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting)  (holding  that  an
ordinance restricting "single-family"  houses to those in which "persons related by blood,
adoption,  or  marriage"  live  infringes  upon  "fundamental"  First  Amendment  rights  of
privacy and freedom  of association);  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,  351-52  (1967)
(overruling Olmstead and stating that "the Fourth Amendment protects people not places.
•..  [W]hat  [an individual]  seeks to preserve  as private,  even  in an area  accessible to the
public, may  be  constitutionally  protected.");  Olmstead  v.  United  States,  277  U.S.  438,
478 (1928)  (Brandeis,  J.,  dissenting)  (identifying  a right of privacy and  describing  it as
"the right to be let alone"  in response  to majority  opinion that held that the government's
use of wiretap  without a search  warrant did not violate the  Fourth Amendment  because
no  physical  intrusion  into  the  home  where  the  calls  were  made);  Louis  Brandeis  &
Samuel  Warren,  The Right of Privacy,  4  HARv. L. REv.  193  (1890)  (stating  that the law
should create a right to privacy protecting private facts).
111.  Brandeis and Warren explored this right of property:
That the individual shall have  full protection  in person and in property
is  a  principle  as  old  as  the  common  law;  but  it  has  been  found
necessary  from time to time to define anew  the exact nature and extent
of such protection....  Thus, in very early times, the law gave a remedy
only for physical interference with life and property, for trespasses vi et
armis.  Then the "right to  life"  served only  to protect the subject  from
battery  in  its  various  forms;  liberty  meant  freedom  from  actual
restraint;  and the right  to  property  secured  to the  individual  his  lands
and his cattle ....  Gradually, the scope of these  legal rights broadened;
and now the  right to life  has come  to mean the  right to  enjoy life-the
right  to  be  let  alone;  the  right  to  liberty  secures  the  exercise  of
extensive  civil  privileges;  and  the  term  "property"  has  grown  to
compromise every  form of possession-intangible,  as well as tangible.
Brandeis  & Warren, supra  note  110, at 193.
112.  Id.; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
113.  Although the preceding  discussion should make clear that not all of the pending
sypware  bills  are  the  same,  or  even  similar,  many  of them  go  far  beyond  requiring
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that  is being impinged  on and  should be  protected as  "private," 114 either
through constitutional protection or common law tort claims. The key, de-
fining characteristics  of property are exclusive ownership  and the ability to
exclude (or invite) others. Do you "own"  streams of data (created by your
interactions by others) about your online transactions and experiences? Do
you expect to be able to consent to, correct, and "remove"  these streams of
data  that you  "own"?  Physically  separable  personal  information  is  very
different to conceptualize, much less protect.
More  importantly,  focusing  on  notions  of inevitably  property-based
privacy  misses  the  forest  for  the  trees.  The  reason  people  are  upset by
spyware  is that it creates oppressive,  unwanted relationships  through,  for
example,  hijacking  their browsers,  or using their PC for an attack on oth-
ers, or  flashing unwanted pop-up  ads. Users'  instinctive  worry is not that
spyware  violates  some preexisting idealized control over particular pieces
of data they  "own"  or could  possibly  define  in advance  in  some  clean,
sterile way. As soon as a user goes online, he or she is thrust into an inter-
active  data  flow  experience  that  is largely  invisible  to  them. There is  no
castle;  there  are  no walls;  there is nothing  to draw a  line around  and say
"this  is private."  Users want many of these data  flows to be  invisible  to
them  (or would want  this  if they  suddenly  had to  control  and authorize
every  data  exchange).  What  is  troublesome  is  bad  interactions-
oppressive, unreasonable relationships that bother the user.
Now that we have identified users'  actual concerns  about spyware,  we
discover  that existing  federal  and  state  laws  and  court-created  doctrines
directed  toward  addressing  oppressive  relationships  may  already  ade-
quately address users'  legal issues.
a)  Federal Law
There  are several  federal  laws addressing  computer privacy.  The fed-
eral Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) already makes unauthorized
restraints  on the use or  collection of personally  identifiable  information to  constraining
the  use  or  collection  of  use  data  generally.  E.g.,  SPY  ACT,  H.R.  29,  109th  Cong.
§ 3(B)(1)(b)  (2005)  (covering  "computer  software  that...  (2)(A)  collects  information
regarding  the Web pages accessed using the  computer; and (B)  uses such information  to
deliver advertising to, or display advertising on, the computer").
114.  But see Julie  E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as  Object,  52  STAN.  L.  REv.  1373,  1377  (2000)  (stating  that  meaningful  autonomy
requires  a degree  of freedom  from  monitoring,  scrutiny,  and categorization  by  others);
Daniel  Solove,  Conceptualizing Privacy, 90  CALIF.  L.  REv.  1087,  1091-92  (2002)
(discussing need for ad hoc, contextual conceptions of privacy).
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computer  intrusions  illegal. 1 5 The  CFAA  has  proven  to be  a  broad  and
flexible statute, under which anyone who obtains information from  a com-
puter or  causes  damage  or obtains  anything of value  can  be sued. 1 6  All
spyware  could potentially be reached by a claim under the CFAA,  as long
as the  code caused  (or would have  caused)  aggregated losses over a  one-
year period of at least $5,000.1  17 Repeated,  intentional  spyware  activity is
likely to meet this threshold." 8
The  Electronic  Communications  Privacy  Act  (ECPA)"1 9  made  it  a
crime  and a  statutory  tort to  intercept electronic  communications,  to dis-
close  intercepted  communications,  or  to  use  intercepted  communica-
tions.' 20  ECPA also made criminal  (and tortious)  any unauthorized  access
to  "stored  electronic  communications."' 121  To  the  extent  that  spyware  is
installed without user consent-which  is often the case-ECPA  may pro-
vide a cause of action against its source.
The FTC has already brought litigation against spyware  sources under
Section  5 of the Federal Trade  Commission Act, which  outlaws unfair  or
deceptive  trade  practices. 122  In  October  2004,  the  FTC  sought  and  ob-
tained  a  federal  court  injunction  against  Seismic  Entertainment  Produc-
115.  18  U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).  The central  offense under the CFAA is the abuse  of a
computer  to obtain  information.  Shurgard  Storage  Ctrs.,  Inc.  v. Safeguard  Self Storage,
Inc.,  119  F.  Supp.  2d  1121,  1128-29  (W.D. Wash.  2000)  (involving  an  employer  who
sued  a  competitor  under  the  CFAA  for  hiring  away  employees  to  improperly  gain
information).
116.  Civil  causes  of action  under  the  CFAA  are  available  against  the  violator  for
compensatory  damages  and  injunctive  relief.  18  U.S.C.  § 1030(g)  (2000);  see  Pac.
Aerospace  &  Elecs.,  Inc.  v.  Taylor,  295  F.  Supp.  2d  1188,  1196  (E.D. Wash.  2003)
(stating that employers  "are increasingly  taking advantage  of the CFAA's civil remedies
to sue former employees  and their new  companies who  seek a competitive  edge through
wrongful use of information from the former employer's  computer system").
117.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
118.  See,  e.g.,  Four Seasons  Hotels  & Resorts  B.V. v.  Consorcio  Barr, S.A.,  267  F.
Supp.  2d  1268  (S.D.  Fla. 2003)  (holding  that a  hotel  licensee  violated  the  CFAA  by.
intentionally  attempting  to  access  the  licensor's  protected  computers  without
authorization,  spoofing  the  licensor's  computers,  causing  congestion  on  the  licensor's
VPN device,  and obtaining information  of value in the form of confidential  customer and
financial data).
119.  Pub.  L.  No.  99-508,  100  Stat.  1848  (1986)  (codified  as  amended  in  scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
120.  18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
121.  Id. §§ 2701-10.
122.  These  provisions  prohibit  unfair  or deceptive  acts  or practices  in  or affecting
commerce.  15  U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
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tions,  Inc.,  Smartbot.net,  Inc.,  and Sanford  Wallace,'2 3 after alleging  that
these actors had installed  software code onto users'  computers without au-
thorization  that  changed  those  users'  home  pages,  downloaded  and  in-
stalled various other programs, caused an incessant stream of pop-up mes-
sages  to be  displayed,  and  triggered  ads  for  defendants'  "anti-spyware"
programs. Defendants did not contest the agency's  factual allegations, but
argued that their actions were "accepted marketing practices used by repu-
table  companies."124 The FTC alleged that defendants'  actions were  "un-
fair."' 25 The court agreed with this assessment and granted an injunction-
adding that it thought defendants'  actions were "deceptive"  as well as "un-
fair.' 126 Thus, the FTC been successful proceeding against "spyware"  pur-
veyors under its existing powers.
b)  State law
Deceptive  trade practices  acts based  on the Uniform  Deceptive  Trade
Practices Act model have been adopted in many states.' 27 California's  un-
fair competition  law imposes  civil  liability  for  "any  unlawful,  unfair  or
fraudulent  business  act or practice  and unfair,  deceptive,  untrue  or  mis-
leading advertising," ' 128 and provides  standing  for  citizens that  can  show
harm by such unfair practices  to bring  claims even where the conduct  al-
leged is a violation of a statute that does not provide for a private  right of
action.129 These acts broadly prohibit unfair or deceptive  conduct in com-
merce, and thus could be used by states in connection with spyware activi-
ties in just the same way that the FTC has used its authority.
123.  FTC  v.  Seismic  Entm't  Prods.,  Inc.,  No.  04-337-JD,  2004  U.S.  Dist. LEXIS
2278  (D.N.H.  Oct.  21,  2004),  available at  http://www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/spy
wiper/20041021 seismicruling.pdf.
124.  Id. at*1l.
125.  Under the FTC  Act, an  act or practice  is unfair if it:  (1) causes  or  is likely  to
cause  substantial  injury to  consumers;  (2)  the  injury to consumers  is not outweighed  by
any countervailing benefits; and (3)  the injury is not reasonably  avoidable by consumers.
See  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000).
126.  "The  affected users were  not  notified of the  defendants'  activities  and did  not
know  what  had  caused  the  problems  with  their  computers,  making  the  defendants'
activities both deceptive  and unfair."  Seismic Entm 't Prods., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
at  *9-*10.
127.  For example, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,  Illinois,  Maine, Minnesota,
Nebraska,  New  Mexico,  Ohio,  Oklahoma,  Oregon.  See  Legal  Information  Institute,
Uniform  Business  and  Financial  Laws  Locator,  http://www.law.comell.edu/
uniforn/vol7.html#dectr  (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
128.  CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE  § 17200 (Deering 2005).
129.  See CAL.  Bus.  &  PROF.  CODE  §17204  (Deering 2005);  Barquis  v.  Merchants
Collection Ass'n of Oakland, Inc., 496 P.2d 817, 828 (Cal.  1972).
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If deception  is difficult to prove,  there is an even broader state law ap-
proach  to  spyware  that  captures  the  essence  of the  spyware  violation:
prima  facie tort. Although  not widely used (and  in fact  often denigrated),
this tort addresses unjustified actions that are  intended to harm another-
or, in other words, the creation of an oppressive  relationship. 130  The prima
facie tort requires (1) an injury to another  and (2) culpable conduct on the
part  of the  actor that  is  (3) unjustifiable  under  the  circumstances.13 1  All
other  specific  intentional  torts  are  instantiations  of the  general  principle
stated  in  the  prima  facie  tort.'3 2  In  the  absence  of a  mature,  specific,
clearly-delineated  "spyware"  intentional  tort  (or even  an  intentional  tort
that clearly  applies  to spyware),  the  prima  facie  tort  will  provide  courts
with a  role  in redressing  oppressive  relationships  created by  code.133 In-
volving courts  in creating a common law of spyware--deciding which op-
pressive  relationships  are  harmful  enough to merit judicial censure-will
allow  for  a  much  more  nuanced  approach  to  spyware  than  is  possible
through legislation.
As  outlined in the previous  two subsections,  both federal and state le-
gal frameworks  already exist that address the concerns that are driving the
current  push  for  spyware  legislation.  Litigation  based  on  these  existing
130.  See  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TORTS  § 870 (1979)  ("One  who  intentionally
causes  injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is
generally  culpable  and  not justifiable  under  the  circumstances.  This  liability  may  be
imposed  although the actor's conduct does not come  within a traditional  category  of tort
liability."). Prima facie  tort is recognized  in Missouri,  New Mexico, and New York. See
Bandag of Springfield, Inc.  v.  Bandag, Inc.,  662  S.W.2d 546, 553  (Mo. Ct. App.  1983);
Schmitz  v.  Smentowski,  785  P.2d  726,  739  (N.M.  1990);  Beavers  v.  Johnson  Controls
World  Servs., Inc,  901  P.2d 761  (N.M.  Ct. App.  1995);  Curiano  v. Suozzi, 469  N.E.2d
1324,  1327  (N.Y.  1984);  Bd. of Educ.  v.  Farmingdale  Classroom  Teachers  Ass'n, 343
N.E.2d 278 (N.Y.  1975).
131.  ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 1230,  1232 (N.Y.  1977).
132.  As for conduct intentionally  causing harm, however,  it has traditionally
been  assumed  that  the  several  established  intentional  torts  developed
separately and independently and not  in accordance  with any unifying
principle.  This Section purports  to supply that unifying principle and to
explain  the  basis  for  the  development  of the  more  recently  created
intentional torts.  More than that, it is intended to  serve  as  a guide  for
determining  when  liability  should  be  imposed  for  harm  that  was
intentionally  inflicted,  even  though the  conduct  does  not come  within
the requirements  of one of the well established  and named intentional
torts.
RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TORTS  § 870 cmt. a.
133.  See  Porter  v.  Crawford  &  Co.,  611  S.W.2d  265,  269  (Mo.  Ct.  App.  1980)
(noting that Justice Holmes introduced the prima facie tort doctrine in this country).
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laws  may  be  a  better  solution  to  spyware  than  legislation-particularly
"notice" and "labeling"  legislation.
But even litigation's  effect on spyware  will  be greatly  constrained  by
interdependencies,  jurisdictional  tangles,  and  technical  realities  that  are
beyond the scope of any court. Spyware purveyors  are certainly not neces-
sarily  based  in  the  U.S.,  and  spyware  often  reaches  consumers  through
highly  complex  chains  of affiliates  whose  relationships  are  very  difficult
to parse. 134 Without an attorney's-fee  recovery  mechanism,  many lawyers
are unwilling to take on the expense  of litigating against spyware  sources,
and prosecutors  often lack the resources to  investigate  technical  spyware
cases.
III.  THE TECHNICAL LANDSCAPE
Given that both  legislation and litigation  are  unlikely  to  be up to the
task  of definitively  solving  the  spyware  problem,  what  should  we  do?
There  is no  one  legal  institution  with  sufficient  knowledge  to  recognize
and  fix the  infinite  varieties  and functionalities  of "bad"  spyware  in ad-
vance.  Legal minds  simply cannot design  a sufficient  attack on spyware.
This Part suggests  that legal  systems can  instead encourage  deference  to
the  development  of technical  immune  networks,  and  points  to  areas  for
possible future work.
The  informational  properties  of the  immune  system  are  remarkable.
Although  the networks  that make  up the human  immune system  are  dis-
tributed  throughout  the  body,  the  system  is  able  to  distinguish  between
"self'  and "nonself" quickly  and retain  this information  in "memory."  It
can thus tell the difference between harmful microbes (foreign materials or
"antigens") and the body. Special types of white blood cells (lymphocytes)
recognize foreign material by forming molecular bonds between these for-
eign materials  and receptors  on the  surface  of the  lymphocyte.  In  effect,
immune system detectors bind to particular (foreign)  short chains of amino
acids-thus  recognizing  the  pattern  encoded  by  these  short  chains.' 35
These  detectors  are  highly  specific,  so  each  recognizes  only  a  limited
134.  Combating Spyware: H.R. 29, the SPY ACT: Hearing  Before the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce,  109th  Cong.  (2005)  (testimony  of Ari  Schwartz,  Associate
Director,  CDT),  available  at  http://www.cdt.org/testimony/20050126schwartz.pdf
(noting that  spyware  download  process is "sustained  through a nearly  impenetrable web
of  affiliate  relationships  that  is  used  to  deflect  accountability  and  frustrate  law
enforcement").
135.  Stephanie  Forrest  & Steven  Hofmeyr, Immunology as Information Processing,
in  DESIGN  PRINCIPLES  FOR  IMMUNE  SYSTEM  &  OTHER  DISTRIBUTED  AUTONOMOUS
SYSTEMS  (L.A. Segal & I.R. Cohen eds. 2000).
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number of foreign  chains.' 36  Some  lymphocytes  (those that mature  in  the
thymus gland)  actually attack and destroy cells that are  recognized  as for-
eign; others mark the foreign cells for destruction. This  distributed system
is error-tolerant,  dynamic,  self-protecting,  and adaptable.' 37 Lymphocytes
that bind too strongly with "self' cells are  selected out,  so that the remain-
ing cells  will be  able to recognize  abnormal peptides.  Once  lymphocytes
have  encountered  and  destroyed  a particular  organism,  they  carry out re-
sistance  to  that  organism  for  some  time-they  remember  their  enemies.
They  also "learn"  new foreign  materials through the  development of new
receptors.  Through a complex  interaction among decentralized molecules,
cells, and  organs, acting  independently  but communicating,  the  system is
able to protect individuals from outside and internal enemies.
Because  it is able to respond in  a fine-grained,  highly parallel, distrib-
uted, decentralized,  and coordinated way to  enormous varieties of foreign
materials,  the  idea  of the human  immune  system  provides  a  fascinating
analogous physiological solution to the spyware problem.' 38 Like antigens,
spyware  comes  in  a  multitude  of forms.  No  centralized  command-and-
control  "inoculation"  system  could  ever  deal  with  spyware,  because  the
learning/feedback  loops would be simply too slow and too clumsy, and it
would fail to deal with intruders  it had never seen before.' 39 An immune
system  can "learn"  about particular  foreign patterns-invading bits-and
then remember what it learns.140  It solves by swarming.
136.  Stephanie  Forrest  &  Steven  Hofmeyr,  John Holland's Invisible Hand.  An
Artificial Immune  System  (1999),  http://www.cs.unm.edu/-steveah  (presented  at  the
Festschrift held in honor of John Holland).
137.  Id.
138.  Computer  scientists  know  this well,  and have  been  working  comfortably  with
this  metaphor  for some  time.  See Forrest & Hofmeyr,  supra note  136.  The  idea  of an
immunity network rather than a legal structure as a solution for a hard problem is new to
lawyers,  however. We are more used to hierarchies.
139.  An FTC Report states, "Because the digital fingerprint  [used by spyware scanner
programs  to  identify  spyware]  is only developed after a spyware  program  is discovered
and analyzed, there  is  a lag  time between the distribution of a spyware program  and the
ability  of  anti-spyware  programs  to  detect  it."  FTC,  SPYWARE  WORKSHOP  REPORT,
MONITORING  SOFTWARE  ON  YOUR PC:  SPYWARE,  ADWARE,  AND  OTHER  SOFTWARE  14
(March 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050307spywarerpt.pdf.
140.  When the immune system encounters  a new pathogen,  it might take three  weeks
or  so  to  clear  the  initial  infection.  Steven  Hofneyr,  An  Immunological  Model  of
Distributed Detection  and Its  Application to  Computer Security  30 (1999)  (unpublished
Ph.D.  dissertation, University  of New Mexico)  (on file with author). But later invasions
by the same  pathogen  will be reacted  to  much more  quickly-indeed, there  may be no
evidence  of a  re-infection.  Id. A  classic  example  of immune  system  memory  is  the
system's reaction to measles. Id.
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A network built like an immune system would allow for a great deal of
redundancy  and simultaneously  reduce  local complexity,  leaving  less  for
individual machines/users  to know. It would observe user-network  interac-
tions; learn the code paths that each application uses during its normal op-
erations ("self'); develop a profile of each application's behavior and then
block  anything  that  falls  outside  that profile  and  is  likely  to  do  serious
harm  ("harmful non-self"); 141 tell the human  later what has been blocked
(which, as "good"  spain  filters have taught us, is much better than simply
blocking  the material  invisibly);  log the event; minimize  harm to the rest
of the life going on inside the network; and allow creation of metainforma-
tion that will help other users.  It would also operate 'in a completely decen-
tralized fashion. The  immune system, after  all,  is made up of millions  of
agents that act completely locally.
As just one  existing  example,  Sana  Security,  founded by Steven Hof-
meyr, is building  computer security  schemes that  are  based on  immunity
ideas.' 42 Sana's software  can "learn  and take care  of itself."'143 It "installs
on the  operating  system and takes  a  snapshot of how the  uninfected  ma-
chine  normally  works."' 144  Then  "it  waits  and watches  for  anomalies  to
normal  computing  behavior  and takes  action  against  any  deviation  that
could harm  the PC or  alter its normal  operation."'145 The  operation  of this
141.  Not  all  pathogens  are  harmful,  and  eliminating  non-harmful  pathogens  might
actually harm the human body. Id. at 1. The same is likely true of code.
142.  See  Sana  Security,  http://www.sanasecurity.com  (last  visited  Aug.  19,  2005).
Computer scientists  have been talking  about software  in biological terms  for some time.
See,  e.g.,  Stephanie  Forrest  et.  al,  Computation in  the  Wild,  in  THE  INTERNET  AS  A
LARGE-SCALE  COMPLEX  SYSTEM  (K. Park & W.  Willinger eds.  forthcoming),  available
at  http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/pubs/articles/FBGA  1917099772.html  (claiming  that
networked  computer systems  can  be better understood,  controlled,  and developed  when
viewed from the perspective of living systems).
143.  John Verity,  Computing, MIT  TECH. REv.,  Oct.  2003,  http://www.techreview.
com/Articles/03/10/trlO0computing1003.asp;  Dan  Neel,  Sana  Gives  Desktop  PCs
Autoimmunity,  SECURITYPIPELINE.COM,  Oct.  25,  2004,  http://www.securitypipeline.
com/news/51200074.
144.  Neel, supra note  143.
145.  Id. A recent article  about watching  botnets (networks of compromised  machines
that can be  instructed remotely by an attacker) described the creation of "honeypots"  that
perform  many  of  the  same  functions.  THE  HONEYNET  PROJECT  AND  RESEARCH
ALLIANCE,  Know  Your Enemy: Tracking Botnets: Using Honeynets to Learn More About
Bots,  Mar.  13,  2005,  http://www.honeynet.org/papers/bots.  These  honeypots  "actively
participate  in networks  (e.g. by crawling the web,  idling  in IRC  channels,  or using  P2P-
networks)  or modify  honeypots  so  that they  capture  malware  and send  it to  anti-virus
vendors  for  further  analysis."  Id. There  are,  however,  also  legal  risks  of monitoring
networks:
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software  may initially  be  annoying,  until we  teach  it what we  want it to
allow. Like a young student, it may begin with many questions.
If Sana can  do this, any  other company can too.  It is very likely that
"immunity networks"  will soon be available to us (either on our own desk-
tops or within our own networks) that will learn our hard drives and watch
for  anomalies. 1 46  In  small  ways,  these  networks  are  already  developing.
Some  excellent  tools are  already  available  to combat  spyware,  including
Microsoft  Anti-Spyware,  Spybot  Search  and  Destroy,  Lavasoft's
AdAware,  CounterSpy  from Sunbelt Software,  and Computer Associate's
eTrust PestPatrol. Sites like spywarewarrior.com  and securitypipeline.com
will help us figure out which networks to join or adopt. 1 47
Very early versions of immunity networks already exist, in the form of
updated  Symantec  or  Norton  client  applications.  To  some  extent,  these
applications  learn  from their  environment  and watch  for events to which
they should  respond. But  I  suggest that these applications  are  primitives.
They are not decentralized or peer-created.  They rely on updated  authori-
tative  blacklists  of undesirable  bits  and  applications.  Significantly,  ISPs
For honeynet deployments in the U.S., consider three  legal issues: first,
ensure that you are in compliance with  the laws that restrict your right
to monitor the activities of users on your system. Second, recognize and
address  the  risk that  attackers  will  misuse  your  honeynet  to  commit
crimes,  or  store  and  distribute  contraband.  Third,  consider  the
possibility  that your honeynet will be used to  attack other systems, and
the potential  liability you could face  for resulting damage. Your lawyer
may  identify  other  legal  issues  as  well.  If you  deploy  a  honeynet
outside the U.S., look to the applicable laws of the jurisdiction  in which
you  will  operate.  Designing  and  implementing  your  honeynet  with
attention to these concerns can help you stay out of legal trouble.
THE HONEYNET PROJECT, KNow YOUR ENEMY 252 (2004).
146.  Cisco  is  already  doing  this.  See  Core Elements  of the  Cisco Self-Defending
Network  Strategy (Cisco  Self-Defending  Network,  White  Paper  2005),  http://www.
cisco.com/enIUS/netsol/ns340/ns394/ns  17 1/ns413/networking-solutions  white-paperO9
00aecd80247914.shtml.  It has  introduced  its  own "adaptive  security"  program,  which
relies  on  "network-based,  multi-layered,  application-oriented,  IP-dependent,  worm
mitigation, dynamic  trust" elements. Id. Its plan is for all network hardware and software
on  the  backbone  and  within  enterprises  to  be  coordinated  to  provide  security  against
spyware  and other security threats. Id. Although  enterprise network security  is a classic
subject, Cisco may have larger plans for "the Internet" itself.
147.  Microsoft  recently  introduced  its  own  anti-spyware  program,  available  to
Windows  XP and Windows  2000 users for free  download through July 2005.  Microsoft
Windows  AntiSpyware  (Beta),  http://www.microsoft.com/athome/security/spyware/
software/default.mspx  (last visited  Aug.  19,  2005). This  event marks  an enormous  step
forward because Windows  operating systems run  on more than  90 percent of computers
worldwide.
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like Earthlink and AOL  are already competing  on the basis of their ability
to protect users from spyware, 148 and many ISPs spend up to 40 percent of
their  customer  service  resources  responding  to  spyware-related  inquir-
ies.
149
All of these  things, taken together,  will provide  a solution  to oppres-
sive  spyware.  They  will  take  the  self-conscious  form  of immunity  net-
works  when  users  affirmatively  tie their  online  access  and  communica-
tions to  the use by themselves and others they communicate with of spy-
ware  protections  that  learn.  We  will  eventually  leave  the  ISP  model  of
"membership"  (which  is  based  only  on  commodity  connectivity  rather
than valuable  learning/reaction  services  provided  by network  administra-
tors)  and  move  towards  participation  in  immunity  networks. 15 0  (These
networks may map  to the  outlines  of current  ISPs for the  foreseeable  fu-
ture,  but with the  rise  of wireless  mesh services  ISPs as  a  business cate-
gory may  diminish  in  importance  as the  years  go by.) 151  Groups  of ma-
chines and people will cluster together, looking for companionship as well
as security,  and to join one  of these  networks will be  to buy into  a  set of
practices governing many different kinds of interactions.
We  should wait for these  steps to take  effect, rather than plunging to-
wards legislative  solutions that are  likely to cause more troubles  than they
solve. Law should now look at technology  problems the way modem doc-
tors look at health care:  "do no harm,"  "do not give  antibiotics when  you
148.  EarthLink offers a free software suite to its users that blocks spyware,  spam, and
viruses.  Earthlink  TotalAccess,  http://www.earthlink.net/software  (last  visited  Aug.  19,
2005). AOL claims  it is the first ISP to offer automated  spyware detection. Paul Roberts,
AOL  Goes  After  Spyware,  PC  WORLD,  Jan.  6,  2004,  http://www.pcworld.com/
news/Article/0,aid, 114106,00.asp.
149.  Jim Thompson, Malware Returns, ISP-PLANET,  May  27,  2005, http://www.isp-
planet.comi/business/2005/spyware.html.
150.  I believe  that  the  ISP  intermediary  business  model,  under which  ISPs provide
commodity connectivity  to  upstream networks,  is already under enormous  pressure,  and
that in the coming years, we will  see great  consolidation  in the  ISP marketplace.  This is
already happening  in India. See Joji Thomas Philip, 80% ISPsfall off infobahn, BUSINESS
STANDARD,  June  14,  2005,  http://www.business-standard.com/iceworld/storypage.
php?hpFlag=Y&chklogin=N&autono= 191508&leftnm=lmnu9&leftindx=9&lselect=0
(reporting that 80 percent of India's 700 private ISPs have gone out of business in the last
four years).  Surviving  ISPs will have to  reinvent themselves  as  much  more meaningful
businesses, and immunity provisions may provide a useful path towards solvency.
151.  See  Microsoft  Networking  Research  Group,  Self-Organizing Neighborhood
Wireless Mesh Networks, http://www.research.microsoft.com/mesh  (last visited Aug.  19,
2005)  (describing  the  topology  of "community-based  multi-hop  wireless  networks,"  in
which  every  member  of the network  contributes  packet-routing  resources).  Traditional
broadband providers (DSL, cable, satellite, TI) will still be needed to get these packets to
the public Intemet, but the intermediary role of the local ISP may disappear in time.
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are  only dealing  with  a  virus,"  and  "help  the  body develop  its  own  de-
fenses."  Congress,  like  an HMO,  should approve  (or defer to) treatments,
fund research,  regulate  use  of highly,  facially  dangerous  substances,  and
otherwise  get out of the way. Much  is already being done  without legisla-
tive involvement.
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNICAL IMMUNITY
NETWORKS
The set of problems that we  lump together as "spyware"  (a set that is
itself  full  of  ever-increasing  variety)  is  a  particular  expression  of the
world's complexity.  We have  opened ourselves  to communication,  and it
is  too much  for us  (or at least  for our relatives)  to deal  with. No human
being, and no legal institution, can single-handedly  take on this problem.
I have suggested in this Article that the only real solutions  to spyware
are  technical  in nature, and that these  technical  solutions will  come in the
form of immunity networks.  This  suggestion  leads  me to  guess  that  our
focus  on individual  privacy and our obsession with global interconnectiv-
ity may both become inappropriate  or irrelevant  as the Internet changes. It
may be time to recognize that individuals, and their unhappy relationships
with spyware, will not always be the most important actors in this techni-
cal  environment. It may be  that individuals  need to  choose  to  cede  some
control  over  their  individual  machines  to  networks  that will  help  in  the
constant fight against oppressive spyware and malware.152
I  am  emphatically  not  suggesting  that  membership  in  an  immunity
network be mandated  by  statute. Rather,  it  may be  that some  of the ulti-
mate connectivity providers (the entities that make it possible to reach the
public Internet) will mandate as a condition of service that individuals sign
up for one of several immunity providers.  It may become more expensive
for individuals who have not joined such a network to be online.
This is not a move towards enforced similarity, as in communism. Nor
is this  a move towards  a voting, democratic  approach to software,  where
software  that  is voted "bad"  becomes  illegal.  Instead, we  need  to recog-
152.  The P3P lesson tells us that even with  some  controls ceded, users can be given
opportunities to reverse or override decisions made by (and defaults set by) machines  and
networks.  P3P,  or  Platform  for  Privacy  Preferences,  automatically  compares  a
consumer's privacy  preferences  with a website's  privacy policy and  alerts the consumer
to any  discrepancies.  See  Platform  for Privacy  Preferences  (P3P)  Project, http://www.
w3.org/P3P  (last  visited  Aug.  19,  2005).  Of course,  even  if  we  cede  some  of our
autonomy to  immunity networks,  and establish  clear boundaries  between  them, we  will
never, ever win the battle against "spyware."  We will experience local emergencies, great
ups and downs, and periods of calm, but we will never be completely at peace.
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nize  that there  is  already  in  the  world  a third way  of governing  that  we
need to begin to embrace as we face difficult technical warfare:  competing
networks.  Such networks  may  be  more  flexible  than  any  presumptively
uniform  law,  although  such  flexibility  will  be  possible  only  if:  (1) exit
from  and  entry  into  these  networks  is  truly voluntary,  and  (2)  adequate
competition among networks exists.
Only by allowing these networks  to "represent"  and protect us techni-
cally will we survive the coming malware  difficulties.  Laws and litigation
will not shield us, because the rate of change is too great and the varieties
of attack  too  diverse.  What  the body  does  with  overwhelming  flows  of
sensory  data is  to "chunk"  it, creating  metainformation  that can  be  dealt
with. Similarly, these new networks will have a real role in collecting data
about  information  flows,  chunking  it,  and using the patterns  that  are  re-
vealed  to protect their  subscribers. The network  will know when it is un-
der attack and will pay attention.  We,  as  individuals  acting  alone,  are no
longer capable  of protecting ourselves  from electronic  attack.  (Of course,
individuals who have access to peer-created shields will be protected. I am
talking  about  individuals  trying  to  decide  on  the  acceptability  of every
electronic message.)
The boundaries between  these immunity networks  will need to be real
as  well. Where these boundaries  are  unclear,  dangerous  electronic  condi-
tions  may  exist.  Voluntary  separation,  with  well-policed  gateways  that
open deliberately, may be the best alternative to violence. I am troubled by
this suggestion, because  I am loath to create gatekeepers  that have  power
over my or anyone else's communications. But even the co-inventor of the
TCP/IP  protocol,  Vint Cerf, said recently that he  wished that  end-to-end
authentication had been part of the protocol's original design. 53 Gateways
between  networks  could check  for communications  that were  adequately
credentialed,  and could perhaps do  so in a lightweight  fashion. To the  ex-
tent we are  at the beginning  of a cataclysmic  series of malware invasions,
we  may  need  to  support  good  fences  in  order  to  keep  communications
flowing at all.154
The legal status of immunity networks raises fascinating questions that
range  far beyond  the  scope  of this initial,  exploratory  study of the  rela-
tively narrow subject of spyware legislation.  It may be that we have come
into  an era in which we need gov  ernments  and hierarchies  for atom-based
153.  Vint  Cerf, General  Comments  at The Freedom  To  Connect  Conference,  Silver
Spring, Maryland (March 30, 2005).
154.  See  David  R.  Johnson,  Susan  P.  Crawford  &  John  G.  Palfrey,  Jr.,  The
Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9  VA.  J.L.  & TECH.  9
(2004).
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issues-when  to  put  someone  in  prison,  when  to  settle  a  property  dis-
pute-but that networks of various kinds, chosen  by us, can best deal with
the problems  of digital  bits.  We  may need  to tell terrestrial  governments
that they are  in  charge  of atoms-food and chemicals-but not in charge
of minds  or culture.  This  may happen as  a matter of course,  without ex-
plicit statements  on anyone's part,  as governments  and prosecutors  come.
to recognize  the  need to defer to  networks  that are  solving  problems  for
citizens.  Until this recognition  dawns,  the  only appropriate governmental
initiative should be to do no harm.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL